Entrepreneurship, Institutions, and the Informal Economy by Wiseman, Travis C.
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports 
2013 
Entrepreneurship, Institutions, and the Informal Economy 
Travis C. Wiseman 
West Virginia University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Wiseman, Travis C., "Entrepreneurship, Institutions, and the Informal Economy" (2013). Graduate Theses, 
Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 171. 
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/171 
This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research 
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, 
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. 
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu. 
  
Entrepreneurship, Institutions, 
and the  
Informal Economy 
 
 
Travis C. Wiseman 
 
 
Dissertation submitted to the  
College of Business and Economics 
at West Virginia University in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in 
Economics 
 
 
Andrew T. Young, Ph.D., Chair 
Roger Congleton, Ph.D. 
Brian Cushing, Ph.D. 
Russell Sobel, Ph.D. 
William Trumbull, Ph.D. 
 
 
Department of Economics 
 
Morgantown, West Virginia 
2013 
 
 
Keywords: corruption, institutional quality, latent variable, MIMIC model, productive 
entrepreneurship, regulation, religion, rent-seeking, shadow economy, tax burden, unproductive 
entrepreneurship, U.S. states 
 
 
Copyright © 2013 Travis C. Wiseman 
  
Abstract 
 
Entrepreneurship, Institutions, and the Informal Economy 
 
Travis C. Wiseman 
 
This dissertation comprises three essays which investigate the empirical 
relationships between institutions (formal and informal), entrepreneurial outcomes 
(productive and unproductive), and shadow economy size at the U.S. state-level. 
Chapter 1 opens with some discussion of the topics explored here and provides an 
overview of important results from each of the essays. In Chapter 2, the first of 
the empirical essays, I focus on U.S. shadow economies, providing estimates of 
shadow economy size for 50 U.S. states over the period 1997 to 2008 as a 
foundation for analysis in the subsequent chapter. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
relationship between entrepreneurship, shadow economy size, and corruption at 
the U.S. state-level. Specifically, I question the importance of the entrepreneur’s 
choice (for which estimates of shadow economy size serve as a proxy) to 
participate in the formal or informal economy as a channel through which public 
official corruption affects observed (formal sector) entrepreneurial outcomes. 
Chapter 4 is a joint effort with Andrew Young. In this essay we revisit Baumol’s 
(1990) conjectures on the role of institutions in determining whether 
entrepreneurs will channel their efforts towards wealth-generating activities or 
toward zero- or negative-sum rent-seeking, using cross-section data on informal, 
religious institutions. Chapter 5 summarizes the conclusions of the 
aforementioned chapters and discusses some possibilities for further investigation. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
“[T]he function of entrepreneurs is to reform or revolutionize the pattern of 
production by exploiting an invention or, more generally, an untried 
technological possibility for producing a new commodity or producing an old one 
in a new way, by opening up a new source of supply of materials or a new outlet 
for products, by reorganizing an industry and so on.”  
 
Joseph A. Schumpeter – Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Chapter XII 
 
The Schumpeterian impression of the entrepreneur’s role in society, while certainly not the only 
impression, forms the basis for the empirical analyses found in the following chapters. It is 
Schumpeter’s (1912 [1934]) theory of the entrepreneur as the individual in society responsible 
for “the carrying out of new combinations” – or “creative destruction” – that prompted William 
Baumol in 1990 to re-examine the role of the entrepreneur in society. Baumol (1990, p. 897-898) 
asked of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur:  
If entrepreneurs are defined, simply, to be persons who are ingenious and creative 
in finding ways that add to their own wealth, power, and prestige, then is it not to 
be expected that not all of them will be overly concerned with whether an activity 
that achieves these goals adds much or little to the social product or, for that 
matter, even whether it is an actual impediment to production. 
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In other words, Baumol’s primary concern is that, by Schumpeter’s definition, the entrepreneur 
may very well carry out “new combinations” that result in plain destruction. Schumpeter’s 
theoretical shortcoming is nowhere more evident than in his own assertion that “[e]ntrepreneurial 
profit is the expression of the value of what the entrepreneur contributes to production” 
(Schumpeter, 1912 [1934]).  
 Baumol’s (1990) extension of the Schumpeterian framework is a powerful theoretical 
contribution. Under the amended framework, Schumpeter’s entrepreneurs behave in much the 
same way, except that allocation of their entrepreneurial resources becomes dependent upon 
institutions. That is, entrepreneurs will, according to Baumol, channel their resources into either 
productive or unproductive activities depending on which activities the institutional framework 
in their local economy make most rewarding. In short, productive entrepreneurs are those whose 
activities expand the size of the economic pie; unproductive entrepreneurs are those who seek to 
either lawfully or unlawfully redistribute it (Baumol, 2007). 
 In the chapters that follow, Baumol’s hypothesis is examined in new light using U.S. 
state-level data. To date, much empirical study of the relationships between institutions and 
entrepreneurial outcomes has focused on formal settings, in terms of both institutions and market 
activity. Here, I investigate ways in which Baumolian entrepreneurs interact with both informal 
markets and informal institutions.  
 Informal markets (or shadow economies) are markets where participants engage in trade, 
undertaken in a way that deliberately conceals their actions from detection by public authorities. 
Absent from either Schumpeter’s or Baumol’s analysis is detailed discussion of productive or 
unproductive activities taking place in such markets. Investigating these relationships, however, 
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is no easy task. Shadow economic activity, by definition, is unobserved. In order to take a closer 
look at these relationships, one must first measure U.S. shadow economies. 
Chapter 2 focuses on estimating shadow economy size. I do so using a unique system of 
equations, known as the MIMIC model, that relates both potential causes of shadow economic 
activity, and potential indicators of the occurrence of shadow economic activity to a measure of 
the shadow economy’s size, in terms of state-level GDP. Recent studies of shadow economies 
focus primarily on cross-country comparisons. Few examine regional or state-level variations in 
underground economic activity. In Chapter 2, I present estimates of the shadow economy for 50 
U.S. states over the period 1997 to 2008. Results suggest that size of government; tax and social 
welfare burdens; labor market regulations; and intensity of regulation enforcement are important 
determinants of the underground economy. Among the states, Delaware, on average, maintains 
the smallest shadow economy at 7.28% of GDP; Oregon, on average, has the second smallest 
shadow economy at 7.41% of GDP; followed by Colorado, averaging 7.52% of GDP, and 
rounding out the three smallest shadow economies in the U.S. West Virginia and Mississippi, on 
average, have the largest shadow economies in the U.S. as a percent of GDP (9.32% and 9.54%, 
respectively). 
With shadow economy estimates in hand, I return to Baumol’s hypothesis. Chapter 3 
explores the relationship between entrepreneurship, shadow economy size, and corruption using 
U.S. state-level productive and unproductive entrepreneurship scores provided by Sobel (2008) 
and Wiseman and Young (2012); state-level shadow economy estimates from Wiseman (2012); 
and per capita measures of state-level public official corruption. I examine whether formal sector 
productive (unproductive) entrepreneurial activity is associated with lower (higher) levels of 
informal economic activity. Additionally, I investigate the importance of the shadow economy as 
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a potential channel through which formal sector entrepreneurs respond to corrupt public officials. 
Using OLS and GMM estimation, I aim to fill a gap between several related literatures by asking 
whether corruption affects entrepreneurial outcomes primarily through its effects on the shadow 
economy. I contend that if this is the case, then estimates of corruption should serve as a good 
instrument for shadow economy size in an entrepreneurial outcome regression. 
Results suggest that shadow economy size correlates robustly, negatively (positively) and 
in a statistically significant way with productive (unproductive) entrepreneurship. Additionally, I 
present evidence that public official corruption is a strong instrument for shadow economy size; 
one for which validity cannot be rejected in regressions on productive, unproductive, and net 
entrepreneurship scores. 
In a joint effort with Andrew Young, Chapter 4 looks closely at entrepreneurship and 
informal institutions. Informal institutions are “rules of the game” such as cultural customs, 
traditions, and codes of conduct that guide (or constrain) human interaction (North, 1991). 
Specifically, we explore the relationships between measures of religiosity and levels of 
entrepreneurial activity, both productive and unproductive, using cross-section U.S. state level 
data. In doing so, we re-visit Baumol’s (1990) conjectures on the role of institutions in 
determining whether entrepreneurs will channel their efforts towards wealth-generating activities 
or towards zero- or negative-sum rent-seeking. Measures of both belief (e.g., the frequency of 
prayer) and belonging (e.g., church attendance) that has been stressed by authors such as Barro 
and McCleary (2003) are closely considered. Results suggest that several religious variables 
significantly and negatively correlate with a state’s productive entrepreneurship score. 
Alternatively, most religious variables in the data do not correlate significantly with 
unproductive entrepreneurship. (An exception is the total number of Christian adherents as a 
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percentage of the population.) Findings also suggest that the percent of individuals reporting as 
atheist/agnostic is positively associated with productive entrepreneurship. 
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation with a summary of Chapters 2 through 4, and some 
discussion about future research possibilities with a focus on entrepreneurship, institutions, and 
informal economies. 
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Chapter 2  
U.S. Shadow Economies: A State-level Study 
 
“[S]muggler; a person who, though no doubt highly blameable for violating the 
laws of his country, is frequently incapable of violating those of natural justice, 
and would have been, in every respect, an excellent citizen, had not the laws of his 
country made that a crime which nature never meant to be so.” 
 
Adam Smith – The Wealth of Nations, Book V, Chapter II, Part II, Article IV 
 
2.1 Introduction 
World-wide, shadow economies have been the focus of much attention in recent years, and for 
good reason. Buehn and Schneider (2012) examine a sample of 162 countries (including 
developing, high-income OECD, Eastern European, and Central Asian countries) and find that, 
on average, shadow economy size is roughly equivalent to 34% of GDP. According to their 
estimates, countries like Zimbabwe, Panama, and Bolivia reside towards the high end of the 
range with shadow economy sizes of 61.8, 63.5, and 66.1% of GDP, respectively (Buehn and 
Schneider, 2012, table 3). For such economies, extralegal activity is, in terms of value, more 
important than the formal economy.  
 While the shadow economy of the U.S. is almost certainly smaller than the world 
average, the available evidence suggests that the underground economy has, at least at times, 
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played an important role. Neuwirth (2011, p. 117), for example, writes of the nation’s black 
markets during World War II: 
[I]n order to channel the nation’s resources for World War II, the United States 
instituted stringent price controls. Yet, all across the land, people and 
producers smuggled products across state lines and price-gouged with 
impunity. As much as 80 percent of the nation’s meat was sold above the price 
the government mandated, along with 60 to 90 percent of the country’s lumber 
and one-third of all clothing. Gas was strictly rationed, but 2.5 million gallons 
a day disappeared, to be sold on the black market. And this doesn’t count 
counterfeited ration coupons.  
 
Sennholz (1984, p. 10) focuses on more recent events:  
During the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. Government, in cooperation with the 
state governments, destroyed millions of jobs. It forcibly raised the cost of 
labor through sizeable boosts in Social Security levies, unemployment taxes, 
Workman’s Compensation expenses, Occupational Safety and Health Act 
expenses, and many other production costs. The mandated raises inevitably 
reduced the demand for labor and added millions of workers to the 
unemployment rolls. The boosts also reduced the take-home pay of the 
remaining workers as market adjustments shifted the new costs to the workers 
themselves. Both effects, the rising unemployment and the falling net wages, 
provided powerful stimuli to off-the-books employment.  
 
And Buehn and Schneider’s (2012, table 3) average estimate of the U.S. shadow economy from 
1999 to 2007 is 8.6 percent of GDP. This is small only in a relative (to other countries) sense; it 
is by no means an economically negligible fraction of total economic activity. When government 
mandated prices result in shortages, underground markets step in to fill the void. Shadow 
economies provide goods and services that consumers demand, but are not available (or 
affordable) in the formal sector. As such, shadow economies often counter the intentions of 
political actors and, therefore, can have important policy implications. For example, large 
shadow economies often mean smaller bases from which governments may collect revenue to 
fund their liabilities. This, in turn, may result in higher budget deficits or tax rates (Schneider and 
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Enste, 2000). Hence, political actors across the world scour for ways in which to bring shadow 
economy participants into the light (see deSoto, 1989, 2000; Neuwirth, 2011).  
 U.S. politicians certainly take shadow economic activity seriously. For example, in 
August 2012 the California state senate proposed legislation (California Senate Bill 1185) aimed 
at combating a growing underground economy. Estimates value California’s underground 
economy somewhere between $60 billion and $140 billion annually.
1
 Previously, an article in the 
L.A. Times cited concern for California’s growing informal sector: “Employers who pay their 
workers cash under the table to avoid payroll taxes, workers’ compensation insurance and other 
government mandates are costing California about $7 billion annually in lost tax revenue and 
undercutting companies that play by the rules [.]”2 Similar reports can be found for other states.3  
 Only a few studies have examined shadow economies at the regional or state-level of 
particular nations (e.g., Buehn, 2011; Torgler et al., 2010; Chaudhari et al., 2006). To my 
knowledge, this paper presents the first attempt to measure U.S. states’ individual shadow 
economies. Measuring a shadow economy, however, is a difficult task. The shadow designation 
implies a realm of economic activity in which its participants prefer to remain out of sight.
4
 
Schneider et al. (2010) go so far as to assert that “doing research in this area can be considered as 
a scientific passion for knowing the unknown” (p. 444). Furthermore, there is much debate over 
the formal definition of shadow economy (see Schneider, 2011). I contend that shadow economic 
activity consists of market activity deliberately undertaken in a way that escapes detection by 
                                                 
1
 Estimates provided by California’s Employment Development Department in analysis of SB 1185: 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_1151-1200/sb_1185_cfa_20120629_140323_asm_comm.html  
2
 “California Officials vow to crack down on underground economy,” by Marc Lifsher, L.A. Times, December 09, 
2011. 
3
 See, for example, the Fiscal Policy Institutes’ study, “The Underground Economy in the New York City 
Affordable Housing Construction Industry,” April 17, 2007. 
(http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/publications2007/FPI_AffordableHousingApril2007.pdf).  
4
 The shadow economy has many synonyms. Among them are: underground, informal, extralegal, black market, 
hidden, parallel, System D, cash economies.  
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public officials. While this definition potentially includes both activity that is illegal generally 
and that which would be legal if not purposefully hidden – by this definition, dealers of illegal 
narcotics and under-the-table moonlighters both contribute to the underground economy – the 
empirical methodology used here focuses more narrowly on otherwise legal market activity.
5
 
A growing shadow economy can be described as a response of individuals who feel 
overburdened by the state. Participants either choose the ‘exit option’ (Schneider and Enste, 
2000) if burdens in the formal sector grow sufficiently large, or, alternatively, they never choose 
the ‘entry option’ as they approach the productive periods of their lifetimes.   
Most of the systematic empirical study of shadow economies has focused outside of the 
U.S. Buehn (2011) finds that, across regions of Germany, higher unit labor costs, unemployment, 
and tax burdens all contribute positively to shadow economy size, while stronger enforcement of 
tax rules and regulations reduce informal activity. Similarly, Chaudhari et al. (2006) evaluate 
variables that measure liberalization across India’s states and find that growth in Indian shadow 
economies is reduced by greater liberalization. Torgler et al. (2010) examine regions of 
Switzerland and find that institutions in line with voters’ preferences, and low tax burdens and 
regulatory barriers contribute to smaller shadow economies.
6
  
                                                 
5
 This is the common claim made in the literature, though one that is highly debatable. Consider, for example, the 
electricity consumption variable that will be used as an indicator in the analysis: electricity consumption statistics 
will measure electricity used for legal and illegal market activity, such as manufacturing marijuana. 
6
 In the case of California’s shadow economy “problem,” an alternative perspective is offered. Flaming et al. (2005) 
suggest that in Los Angeles, where, according to their study “most net job growth […] is occurring in the informal 
sector,” the shadow economy is the direct result of relaxed government oversight. In their words: “workers are 
sandwiched between questionable employers, lack of rights, and economic desperation” (p.38). Indeed, recent 
studies find some support for Flaming et al. (2005). For example, Buehn and Schneider (2012) investigate several 
enforcement variables and find evidence that heightened enforcement reduces the size of the shadow economy. This 
brings to bear an interesting question: if taxes, social welfare, and regulatory burdens are the supposed cause of 
movement to the underground, can these very same burdens, channeled to greater oversight, be the solution? In 
other words, which might be the more effective policy for reducing shadow economy size: lower burdens, or 
enhanced oversight? 
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 The purpose of this paper is to construct reliable measures of shadow economy size for 
the 50 U.S. states over the period 1997 to 2008.
7
 In doing so, I investigate several of the 
aforementioned potential causes of underground activity. To my knowledge, this is the first 
comprehensive state-level study of U.S. shadow economies. For each state, I provide a complete 
annual time series of estimates for more than a decade. I build estimates of underground activity 
using a MIMIC (multiple indicators multiple causes) model – a structural equation model with a 
single latent variable. The MIMIC model, as its name suggests, makes use of several observed 
variables, separated into indicators and causes, to assess unobserved underground activity. 
Results suggest that tax and social welfare burdens, labor market regulations, and intensity of 
regulation enforcement are statistically significant determinants of shadow economy size.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2.2 provides a discussion of 
the data used here and their role as causes and indicators of informal sector activity. Section 2.3 
discusses the MIMIC model, section 2.4 provides empirical results, and section 2.5 concludes the 
investigation with some closing remarks.   
 
2.2 Theory and Measurement of Shadow Economies 
This analysis attempts to assess the size of underground economies at the state-level for the U.S. 
over the period 1997 to 2008 using a Multiple-Indicators-Multiple-Causes (MIMIC) model. The 
MIMIC model is a system of equations that relates both potential causes of shadow economic 
activity, and potential indicators that shadow economic activity is occurring to a measure of the 
shadow economy’s size. What I mean here by the size of the shadow economy is the amount of 
economic output that is deliberately hidden from public officials and, therefore, not accounted 
                                                 
7
 District of Columbia is excluded from the study. 
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for in official measures of state-level GDP. Having estimated shadow economy size, I report it 
for each state and year relative to measured income, or GDP.  
 The latent variable in the system is, of course, unobservable. In the case of the shadow 
economy, this is largely by the design of its participants. The intuition behind the MIMIC model 
is to use the observed cross-state variation in causes (e.g., regulatory activity) and indicators 
(e.g., electricity consumption) to estimate unobserved shadow economic activity. The analysis 
here runs along the lines of, e.g., Buehn and Schneider (2012) who use a MIMIC model and 
exploit cross-country variation in observable indicators and causes. In this section I discuss each 
of the indicator and cause variables that I incorporate. The technical details of estimating the 
MIMIC model will follow in section 2.3.  
 With this definition in mind, I consider the following determinants and indicators of the 
shadow economy that are suggested by both theory and previous studies.  
 
2.2.1 Determinants 
 
Taxation, Charges, and Social Welfare Burdens 
 
Prominent in the shadow economy literature is analysis of the burdens of taxation and social 
welfare – social security payments, transfers, subsidies, etc. Tax and social welfare burdens have 
been identified among the leading contributors to shadow economy size (see e.g., Schneider, 
2012; Buehn and Schneider, 2012; Buehn, 2011; Feld and Schneider, 2010). Intuitively, as the 
size of government’s redistributive role increases the incentive to turn to the underground 
economy also increases. Where individuals find that they can avoid or evade taxes by opting to 
work or barter in the informal sector, they often will. 
In order to measure tax and social program burdens I employ three measures: (1) indirect 
tax revenue as a percent of GDP; (2) current charges revenue as a percent of GDP; and (3) a 
 12 
 
measure of institutional quality – the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of North America 
index (EFNA)
8
 “size of government” component. Since both (1) and (2) represent tax and social 
burdens as a percent of GDP, I expect each of these revenue measures to correlate positively 
with shadow economy size. The freedom index, on the other hand, scores the size of government 
on a 0 to 10 scale. A score of 10 indicates a high degree of freedom from burden and is based on 
three underlying measures: general government consumption expenditures; transfers and 
subsidies; and social security payments – each of these measured as a percent of GDP. Since a 
higher score represents lower burden, I expect a negative relationship between the index score 
and shadow economy size. 
 
Labor Market Freedom 
 
Labor market regulations tend to distort labor costs. However, in the shadow economy literature, 
such regulations correlate in an ambiguous way with the shadow economy.
9
 On one hand, as the 
burdens of hiring, firing, or maintaining an employee in the official sector grow, employers and 
employees may opt to purchase or supply labor, respectively, in the shadow economy. These 
potential burdens arise in several forms – wage fixing, compensation requirements, competition 
from the public sector, union activity, etc. On the other hand, labor market regulations may very 
well attract participation in the formal sector, even if for short periods. One can imagine, for 
example, construction workers responding to changes in rules governing unemployment 
compensation. As the length of compensation periods increase, workers engaged in underground 
markets might find it profitable to enter the formal sector in order to meet minimum 
requirements for the program. Minimum wage adjustments, too, may invite marginal participants 
                                                 
8
 http://www.freetheworld.com/efna.html 
9
 See, for example, Kucera and Roncolato (2008) for an extensive survey of studies that examine labor market 
regulations against shadow economy outcomes. 
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in the informal economy to engage more often in the formal sector. The ambiguity lies with the 
relative adjustments undertaken by potential employers versus employees. 
To capture burdens placed on the labor market, I use two measures: (1) insurance trust 
expenditures (an aggregate of state-government unemployment compensation, employee 
retirement, and workers’ compensation expenditures) as a percent of GDP; and (2) a measure of 
institutional quality expressed as the “labor market freedom” component of the EFNA index. 
This component captures the burdens employees and employers face with respect to three 
underlying subcomponents: minimum wage legislation, government employment, and union 
activity. The minimum wage score measures the annual income earned by persons working at the 
minimum wage as a percent of GDP per capita. A higher minimum wage to GDP per capita ratio 
suggests higher limits on the ability for employer-employee negotiation.
10
 Government 
employment is measured as a percent of total employment. A higher ratio of government 
employees to total employment suggests higher limits on the ability for individuals and firms to 
contract freely for labor services. This also suggests that perhaps government is attempting to 
provide higher levels of goods and services that would otherwise be found in the free market 
(Ashby et al., 2011). Union density is included to capture the potential for higher labor costs that 
accompany collective bargaining.
11
 Similar to the Government Size scores, the Labor Market 
Freedom scores are measured on a scale from 0 to 10. A score of 10 indicates a high degree of 
labor market freedom.  
 
 
                                                 
10
 For example, a minimum wage requirement of $2 an hour in New York will have little impact, but for a 
developing nation, it might remove most potential workers from the effective workforce. The same idea holds, 
though in a narrower range, for jurisdictions within the United States (Ashby et al., 2011). 
11
 Though individuals should have the right to organize for the purposes of collective bargaining, laws and 
regulations governing the labor market often force workers to join unions when they would rather not, and make it 
difficult to escape unionization where coercion can most easily be employed (Ashby, et al., 2011). 
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Regulatory Activity 
 
Participation in the underground economy also depends on the likelihood of detection by 
authorities. Buehn and Schneider (2012) find, using various enforcement measures across 
countries, that enforcement is a statistically significant determinant of shadow economy size. 
Importantly, they show that increased regulation serves as a shadow economy deterrent. It is 
therefore worthwhile to consider government regulatory enforcement as a potential informal 
sector deterrent here. Data on monitoring non-compliance in the formal economy, however, is 
rather limited. At the U.S. state-level, the Census Bureau’s “Protective Inspection and Regulation 
(PIR)” expenditure is one potential proxy for government’s commitment to enforcing regulation.  
 Campbell et al. (2010) build a case for including this measure alongside the EFNA on the 
grounds that the regulations listed under the PIR entry in the Census Bureau’s Classification 
Manual have the same potential to impede economic activity as those currently covered by the 
EFNA. I contend that much of the stifled economic activity resulting from increased protective 
inspection and regulation potentially stems from detection of those performing the regulated 
activities in the informal sector – included in the Census Bureau’s list, for example, are 
inspection and enforcement of licensing for barbers, beauticians, construction work, etc.
12
 
Assuming successful application of the PIR expenditures, I expect a negative relationship 
between PIR and shadow economy size.  
 
  
                                                 
12
 See the Chapter 2 appendix for an abbreviated quote of the Census Bureau’s Classification Manual entry for 
“Protective Inspection and Regulation.” A definition of purpose, examples, and exclusions are provided. 
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2.2.2 Indicators 
 
Official Economy
13
 
 
The state of the official economy is indicative of shadow economy size (see e.g., Buehn and 
Schneider, 2012; Schneider, 2011; Schneider et al., 2010; Schneider and Buehn, 2009). As 
market participants alternate between the formal and informal sectors, one can expect these 
changes to be reflected in measures of the official sector. A growing shadow economy, for 
example, extracts labor and other inputs from the official economy, potentially reducing its size. 
As individuals engage more in shadow economies, they give up use of their resources (e.g., time, 
human capital, etc.) in the formal sector. This implies a trade-off, in terms of earned income, 
between the formal and informal sectors. Thus, GDP per capita should correlate negatively with 
shadow economy size, all else equal. 
 
Electricity Consumption  
 
I use electricity consumption as a proportion of GDP as an indicator. A widely-used method of 
measuring the shadow economy indirectly is the electricity consumption method. Indeed, this 
method dominates much of the literature surveying the shadow economies of transitional nations 
of Central and Eastern Europe (see, e.g., Lacko, 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2000b; Johnson et al., 1997). 
This method considers the relationship between electricity consumption and GDP and is 
grounded on the assumption that production requires electricity in both the formal and informal 
sectors. In other words, electricity consumption data is more likely to capture “total” economic 
                                                 
13
 In other cases (particularly cross-country studies) GDP per capita is used as a control determinant for the shadow 
economy size. It is useful in this sense when considering nations that are relatively heterogeneous – developing 
nations, and combined observations of high-income and developing nations, are examples of such a mix. Buehn and 
Schneider (2012), for instance, alternate their use of GDP per capita as a determinant and an indicator variable 
depending on the mix of economies they are considering in various specifications. For their specifications that 
consider developing, transition, and all countries in the study – developing, transition, and high income – they use 
GDP per capita as a determinant. When they consider only high-income OECD countries in their specifications – 
relatively homogeneous countries – they use GDP per capita as an indicator. Following Buehn and Schneider 
(2012), I consider real GDP per capita here as an indicator. 
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activity than official measures of GDP. The difference between “total” and “official” economic 
activity then suggests underground activity.
14
 One criticism of using the electricity consumption 
method to measure shadow economy size is that it is too limited in scope (Schneider and Enste, 
2000) – that is, informal market participants have at their disposal many other sources of energy 
that may be used for production (e.g., natural gas). It is still worthwhile to consider electricity 
consumption as a “total” measure relative to “official” measures of GDP, however, for the 
purposes of indicating underground activity. It offers the ability to capture at least some 
extralegal production.  
 
Labor Force Participation 
Shadow economies extract labor from the official sector. The U.S. labor force is defined as the 
portion of the civilian population age 16 and over who are non-institutionalized and either 
employed or unemployed and actively seeking work.
15
 It is certainly plausible that all members 
of the labor force may participate marginally in the shadow economy. However, it may be that as 
labor force participation declines relative to the broader civilian population, those who are no 
longer formally employed or job-seeking (i.e., no longer receiving unemployment benefits, etc.) 
are more likely to look for work in the shadow economy. I use data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics to measure growth in labor force participation. All else equal, positive (negative) 
growth in labor force participation may indicate a decrease (increase) in shadow economic 
activity. 
 Table 2.1 provides a summary description of all variables included in the analysis and 
discussed above. Before moving on to discuss empirical methodology, I provide a cursory glance 
                                                 
14
 For a more detailed discussion of the electricity consumption method, and other direct and indirect methods of 
measuring shadow economy, see Alderslade et al’s (2006) comprehensive survey. For additional uses of the various 
methods and criticisms, see also Schneider and Enste (2000). 
15
 http://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_htgm.htm 
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at the data to motivate the study.  Figure 2.1 illustrates basic correlations between indirect tax as 
a percent of GDP (determinant) and several potential indicators of shadow economic activity 
using averages across the period 1997 to 2008. Figure 2.1 shows a negative (-3554.86) and 
statistically significant (at the 1% level) relationship between indirect tax and Real GDP per 
capita; a positive (0.46) and statistically significant (at the 5% level) relationship between 
indirect tax and electricity consumption (hundreds of kilowatt hours) as a fraction of GDP; and a 
negative (-1.46) relationship between indirect tax and the labor force participation rate, 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms of the effect that indirect taxation has on each of 
these indicator variables, the coefficients can be interpreted as the change associated with a 1 
percentage point increase in indirect tax as a percent of GDP. In other words, such an increase in 
taxation is associated with approximately a $3600 decrease in official sector per capita incomes; 
a 0.46 increase in electricity consumption as a fraction of GDP (the sample mean and standard 
deviation of this measure are 3.75 and 1.49, respectively); and a 1.46 percentage point decline in 
labor force participation. Moreover, each of these relationships is consistent with the theory and 
expectations outlined above.    
 
2.3  Empirical Methodology 
 
The econometric method used in this paper to estimate the size of the shadow economy is the 
multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) model. The MIMIC model used here is a structural 
equation model that assesses a single latent variable. Previous methods such as the electricity 
consumption approach or the currency demand approach rely exclusively on a single indicator to 
capture underground activity. The MIMIC model, as its name suggests, makes use of several 
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observed variables, separated into indicators and causes, to assess unobserved underground 
activity. 
Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984) were the first to use this econometric methodology for 
the purpose of assessing the hidden economy. Others have since popularized the MIMIC 
approach for this purpose (see e.g., Schneider, 2012; Buehn and Schneider, 2012, Buehn, 2011; 
Dell’Anno and Solomon, 2008).  
The purpose of a structural equation model such as MIMIC is to examine unobserved (or 
latent) variables expressed in terms of their relationships to observed variables. Specifically, the 
model assumes that the unobserved variable can be reconstructed from the observed variables’ 
covariances. In this analysis, the single unobserved variable I wish to capture is the shadow 
economy. It will be explained using the covariance matrix of observed variables discussed in the 
previous section.  
The MIMIC model makes simultaneous use of a measurement (factor analytical) model 
and a structural model. The former establishes a relationship between observed variables 
indicative of unobserved activity; the latter connects observed variables, serving as potential 
causes of the unobserved phenomena, to the latent variable. Thus, the MIMIC model equations 
can be stated in the following way:  
                (2.1) 
 
                  (2.2) 
 
 
where I is a column vector of i observed indicator variables, i=1,…,N; Shadow is the latent 
variable; C is a column vector of j observed causal variables, j=1,…,J; β is a column vector of 
coefficients for Shadow; φ’ is a row vector of coefficients for C; ε is an (ix1) error term for the 
measurement equation; and µ is a (scalar) error term for the structural equation. The error terms ε 
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and µ are assumed to be uncorrelated, with    ( )   , and    ( )     Substituting equation 
(2.2) into equation (2.1) yields the following multivariate equation:  
 
            (2.3) 
  
 
where      ,         , and    ( )        .  
 For model (2.3) to be estimated, it requires that model (2.1) first be normalized.
16
 This is 
accomplished by setting one element of β equal to 1. Maximum likelihood estimation is then 
applied to the model. 
In summary, populating equations (2.1) and (2.2) with the variables discussed in the 
previous section yields the following potential measurement and structural equations, 
respectively:   
 
 
[
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     (2.2)’  
 
Figure 2.2 presents a path diagram that, hopefully, summarizes the model with some intuitive 
perspective. 
 
                                                 
16
 A condition typical of simultaneous equations models is the singularity of the regression matrix. A similar 
condition arises for the error covariance matrix as the result of the normalization requirement for the measurement 
equation (Chaudhari, et al., 2006). For more on simultaneous equations modeling, see e.g., Bollen (1989). 
 20 
 
2.4 Results 
MIMIC Model Results 
 
Table 2.2 provides econometric results for MIMIC model regressions. A panel of the 50 U.S. 
states is examined across the period 1997 to 2008 (600 observations). The Census Bureau does 
not provide “productive inspection and regulation (PIR)” expenditure data for the years 2001 and 
2003. In all specifications, I average the PIR data for years 2000/2002 and 2002/2004 to fill in 
missing data for 2001 and 2003, respectively.
17
 Specifications 2 and 3 are included as robustness 
checks. In these specifications, I remove the EFNA scores from the regressions and substitute, as 
a measure for government size, either government consumption expenditures as a percent of 
GDP (specification 2) or percent of the population receiving supplemental security income 
benefits for disability purposes (specification 3). This is done to remove any index element from 
the calculations and check the application of a more “direct” approach.   
 In specification 1, the cause variables government size, indirect tax revenue, charges, and 
regulation activity are statistically significant correlates and carry the expected signs. Labor 
market freedom is a statistically significant correlate and carries a negative sign (suggesting 
more labor market freedom causes lower participation in shadow economies); conversely, 
insurance trust, too, is a statistically significant correlate and carries a negative sign (suggesting 
greater government expenditures directed toward unemployment, employee retirement, and 
workers’ compensation leads to less participation in the underground). This is consistent with the 
ambiguity discussed in section 2.2 regarding the sign of labor market regulation effects. 
                                                 
17
 Excluded from Table 2.2 are specifications which are regressed using only available data. Though regressions of 
this sort are run on a reduced number of observations, they yield no measurable difference in terms of economic and 
statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. 
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 Turning to indicator variables, these are the same across all specifications. Measures of 
labor force participation and real GDP per capita both carry the expected sign, but only real GDP 
per capita, however, exhibits statistical significance. The electricity consumption measure is used 
consistently across specifications as the fixed, a-priori value required in order to satisfy the 
MIMIC model identification rule (see section 2.3). It is important to recall equation (2.1) when 
interpreting coefficients listed in the “Indicator” section of Table 2.2. These coefficients 
represent βs, and thus the effect of shadow economy size on the indicator variable. 
Important for evaluating the above specifications is model goodness of fit. Table 2.2 
includes two tests for goodness of fit: the chi-square or “exact fit” test and the Steiger and Lind 
(1980) root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA).
18
 The former is commonly evaluated 
as “fitting,” if the chi-square statistic (  ) is smaller than the expected distribution value with a 
probability of occurrence greater than 0.05 (Barrett, 2007). By this measure, specifications 1 and 
2 in Table 2.2 reveal a good fit (at the 5% level, the critical values for 10 and 12 degrees of 
freedom, respectively, are 18.31 and 21.03). 
Perhaps a more popular test for simultaneous equation model fit is RMSEA. RMSEA 
values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.08, as a general rule, indicate excellent, good, and fair (or mediocre) 
fit, respectively (see MacCallum, et al., 1996; Browne and Cudeck, 1993) when paired with 
probability of close fit (p-close) values greater than 0.10. Results from RMSEA tests suggest 
specifications 1 and 2 in Table 2.2 are a good fit; specification 3 qualifies as fair. With these 
statistics in mind, I move on to estimate state-level shadow economy size. 
 
  
                                                 
18
 See Barrett (2007), MacCallum et al. (1996), and Browne and Cudeck (1993) for details regarding each of these 
tests. 
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Shadow Economy Estimates 
 
Estimating the size of the shadow economy from MIMIC model results requires two 
steps. First an index is constructed by applying the underlying time series to a model specified in 
Table 2.2. I use specification 1 to estimate state-level shadow economy size:
19
  
 
SHADOWit = -0.379*GOVit + 0.206*TAXit + 0.068*CHGit - 0.069*LABORit - 0.200*INSit - 0.054*REGit 
 
In terms of standard deviation, government size has the largest effect on shadow 
economy size. A one-unit increase in the “size of government” (GOV) score (which implies a 
higher degree of freedom from burden) leads to a 0.379 percentage point decrease in shadow 
economy size (significant at the 1% level). Taxes (TAX) and charges (CHG) as a percent of GDP 
are each positively correlated in a statistically significant way to shadow economy size 
(correlations are 0.206 and 0.068, respectively, and each significant at the 1% level). A one-unit 
increase in the “labor market freedom” (LABOR) score (which implies a higher degree of labor 
market freedom) causes a 0.069 percentage point decrease in shadow economy size (significant 
at the 5% level). Insurance trust expenditures and protective inspection (INS) and regulation 
expenditures (REG) – each measured as a percent of GDP – both correlate negatively with 
shadow economy size (correlations are -0.200 and -0.054; significant at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively).  
Since the underlying data are standardized, the index constructed, based on these results, 
yields state-level standard deviations of shadow economy size from the national average.
20
 The 
                                                 
19
 As a robustness check, I also estimate shadow economy size using estimates from specifications 2 and 3. The 
results, whether generated by specifications 1, 2, or 3 are highly correlated (a basic correlation matrix reveals no less 
than a 0.82 correlation between alternatives). Moreover, the rank order of shadow economy size (reported in Table 
2.3) does not change in any meaningful way; for example, Delaware, Oregon, and Colorado maintain the smallest 
shadow economies, while West Virginia and Mississippi have the largest, respectively, in any case. Additionally, 
results from a specification not reported here that include all causal variables except Government Consumption as a 
percent of GDP yield similar results (highly correlated at 0.99 to those used to estimate shadow economy size), 
though the model is a weaker fit (by RMSEA and Chi test stats) than those reported.  
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second step to constructing reliable shadow economy estimates is calibration. In this context, 
calibration means finding a base (average), exogenous estimate to which the index of standard 
deviations can be applied. I use Schneider (2010b) estimates of the U.S. shadow economy size 
for years 1997 to 2008.
21
 Table 2.3 provides calibrated results for shadow economy size (% 
GDP) at the U.S. state-level. It appears that, on average, shadow economy size has decreased for 
all states across the period 1997 to 2008. This is consistent with other studies of shadow 
economies around the world. Schneider (2010b, table 3), for example, shows that shadow 
economy size decreased on average for most OECD countries across the same period leading up 
to the 2008 financial crisis. Post 2008, however, it appears shadow economy size is again on the 
rise for these same countries. This makes intuitive sense. As these economies entered recession, 
unemployment rates began to rise. According to the theory outlined in section 2.2 with regards to 
labor force participation in the official economy, as formal sector employment diminishes, and 
job-seekers’ unemployment benefits dry up, individuals may turn to the informal sector to ease 
financial woes. It will be interesting to evaluate this trend at the U.S. state-level as the data 
becomes available. 
States are also ranked by their average shadow economy size in Table 2.3. A rank of 1 
indicates, among the 50 states in the study, the state with the smallest shadow economy as a 
percent of GDP. Delaware, Oregon, and Colorado rank 1, 2, and 3, respectively in terms of 
average shadow economy size across the period. Alternatively, West Virginia and Mississippi, 
on average, have the largest shadow economies in the U.S. as a percent of GDP.  
                                                                                                                                                             
20
 The state-level variables are standardized based on the national averages of the data. 
21
 Schneider (2010b) estimates are calibrated using results from a cash demand approach. One notable criticism of 
the MIMIC model is its use for constructing a cardinal time series of shadow economy size. Since the MIMIC model 
can only produce an ordinal time series index, cardinal calibration requires use of past shadow economy estimates, 
ultimately dependent on other methods such as electricity consumption and currency demand. For additional 
discussion of both advantages and disadvantages of the MIMIC model approach to estimating shadow economy 
size, see the Schneider (2010a) appendix. 
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In terms of standard deviation, Mississippi’s shadow economy size, on average, is 1.26 
percentage points (% GDP) above the national average; the highest positive deviation recorded 
for the states. Delaware, by contrast, with the largest negative deviation, averaged 1.00 
percentage points (% GDP) below the national average; a remarkable difference! In terms of real 
GDP, Delaware’s and Mississippi’s shadow economies are valued (on average) at $3.6 billion 
and $7.5 billion, respectively. Both, however, are relatively small in absolute terms. By 
comparison, my estimates suggest California’s average annual shadow economy is valued at 
approximately $117.5 billion – which falls between California’s Employment Development 
Department’s $60 to $140 billion annual estimates mentioned in section 2.1 – and is the largest 
shadow economy in terms of total real income.  
Interestingly, in terms of real GDP per capita, the story changes. Idaho, West Virginia, 
Montana, Mississippi, and Arkansas represent the 5 smallest shadow economies, respectively. 
Arkansas is the largest of the 5 with a shadow economy valued at approximately $2,700 per 
capita. Alternatively, Massachusetts, Wyoming, Connecticut, Delaware, and Alaska represent the 
5 largest (increasing in order) shadow economies on a real GDP per capita basis. Alaska, the 
largest, maintains an average annual shadow economy valued at $4,555 per capita. This seems to 
suggest that where shadow economies are smaller relative to total state GDP, individuals that 
participate in underground activity extract higher incomes (measured by GDP) on a per capita 
basis. A plausible story might be that, given the smaller relative size of the shadow economy in 
such places as Delaware, informal participants can charge higher prices for their services. An 
informal construction laborer, for example, could most likely command higher prices for his or 
her services in places where both official sector incomes are higher, and informal labor is 
relatively scarce. Data on state-level informal sector populations, however, is not currently 
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available. So whether or not supply of informal sector services drives these results is, at best, a 
guess.  
A cursory look at income levels, however, provides some support for this hypothesis. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between average shadow economy size as a percent of 
GDP and average real per capita GDP. The scatter plot shows that a 1 percentage point increase 
in shadow economy size relative to GDP is related to approximately a $10,200 decrease in real 
GDP per capita (statistically significant at the 1% level). This is not all that surprising given the 
results provided in Table 2.3. Delaware, the smallest shadow economy size relative to GDP, is 
among the highest income states in terms of GDP per capita. West Virginia and Mississippi, two 
of the lowest ranked (Table 2.3) in terms of shadow economy size, are also among the lowest 
income states. Figure 2.4 provides a scatter of average real GDP levels against shadow economy 
size. The raw correlation suggests a 1 percentage point increase in shadow economy size relative 
to GDP is related to an approximate $201.3 million decrease in real state-level GDP (statistically 
significant at the 1% level).  
Figure 2.5 illustrates the per capita value of shadow economies against shadow economy 
size (as a percent of GDP). The raw correlation suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in 
shadow economy size is associated with an approximately $460 lower per capita shadow 
economy GDP (statistically significant at the 1% level). Based on these results, it seems as 
though informal economy participants exploit the conditions of both the formal and informal 
sector. Where ‘rules of the game’ make it more costly to participate in underground activity, 
individual informal actors command higher incomes. Conversely, where the rules reduce the cost 
of underground activity, informal sector per capita GDP levels are lower. 
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Another plausible story to high per capita informal GDP in small shadow economies 
might be that informal economy participants in states with large shadow economies are less 
productive. This is a reasonable assumption if human capital stocks correlate positively with 
institutional quality. A state with poor institutions, all else equal, will have a larger shadow 
economy as a percent of GDP, but it may also have relatively low human capital stock. Figure 
2.6 plots institutional quality scores from the Economic Freedom of North America index against 
percent of states’ populations with a bachelor’s degree or higher. Data on educational attainment 
come from the U.S. Census Bureau. The raw correlation is positive (slope equals 2.41) and 
significant at the 5% level. Figure 2.7 depicts percent of states’ populations with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher against shadow economy size. The raw correlation is negative (slope equals -
4.77) and significant at the 1% level. These results support the low human capital, large shadow 
economy hypothesis. States such as West Virginia and Mississippi have very low human capital 
– if ranked across the 50 states in the study, West Virginia falls last, Mississippi ranks 48th – and 
the largest shadow economies. Alternatively, Massachusetts and Colorado have the highest 
human capital stocks, respectively, but relatively small shadow economies. 
Regardless of the underlying cause of high informal incomes in smaller relative shadow 
economies, the trade-off has an important implication. When shadow economy GDPs are added 
to official sector GDPs, the states’ ranks on a GDP per capita basis do not change in any 
significant way. Table 2.4 provides states’ ranks by GDP per capita. A larger rank represents 
lower income. Column 1 illustrates rank by official measures of GDP per capita. Column 2 
illustrates rank when informal income is added to official income. Column 3 provides change in 
rank between columns 1 and 2.  
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Robustness: Estimation Using the Electricity Consumption Method 
Finally, I estimate shadow economy size for 50 U.S. states using the aforementioned single-
variable electricity consumption approach following the methods of Kaufmann and Kaliberda 
(1996). Results are reported in Table 2.5. The founding assumption of this method is that since 
electricity is used in the production of goods and services in both the formal and informal 
sectors, electricity consumption data works well to capture total economic activity. This claim is 
supported, empirically, by world-wide observation of unitary electricity/GDP elasticity 
(Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996). Growth in electricity consumption, then, is considered to be 
nearly synonymous with growth in total (versus official) GDP.  
 For each year in the study, I calculate the difference between growth in state-level 
electricity consumption and growth in official measures of GDP. This difference amounts to 
GDP growth not captured by formal measures of GDP and serves as a proxy for growth in 
shadow economy incomes. Table 2.6 provides an example of the calculation method.  
 One notable criticism that applies to nearly all shadow economy size estimation 
techniques is reliance on baseline (exogenous) estimates to calibrate the estimates (see the 
calibration discussion above as it relates to the MIMIC method).
22
 To eliminate as many 
concerns as possible surrounding the arbitrary nature of the choice of exogenous estimates for 
                                                 
22
 “Benchmarking,” as calibrating estimates is often termed in the literature, raises some serious concerns with 
estimates of shadow economy size. Particularly, benchmarking techniques vary and the researcher’s choice of which 
technique to use is completely arbitrary. There is no consensus on the best technique. Moreover, each estimate used 
as a benchmark itself was likely the result of some other benchmarking procedure. Another serious criticism 
concerning the use of the MIMIC method (since it is the most often used nowadays) is that the method was 
originally developed to measure intelligence and therefore unsuitable for economic purposes (see Breush, 2005, for 
a lengthy criticism of the MIMIC method in this vein). Schneider (2010a, p. 462) acknowledges “a strong difference 
between economic and psychological variables,” but contends that the MIMIC approach cannot be eliminated. 
Though these criticisms should be (and are) taken seriously (see, e.g., Dell’Anno and Schneider, 2006; Schneider, 
2010a; Schneider and Enste, 2000), there is no solid evidence that supports the MIMIC approach being more or less 
useful in either psychoanalysis or economics; or better or worse than any other approach to estimating shadow 
economy size.    
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calibration, I benchmark both the MIMIC estimates and those constructed by the electricity 
consumption technique using data from the same source (Schneider, 2010b). 
 Results from the electricity consumption method (Table 2.5) are inconsistent with those 
from the MIMIC method (Table 2.3). First, results from the two methods are only moderately 
correlated (0.25). In terms of shadow economy size, very few of the states’ shadow economies, 
when measured by the electricity consumption method, are similar to their MIMIC method 
counterparts. In terms of rank, the smallest shadow economies as estimated by the MIMIC 
method all fall significantly farther down in rank when estimated using the electricity 
consumption method. For example, Delaware, Oregon, and Colorado fall from ranks 1, 2, and 3 
to ranks 39, 10, and 20, respectively. Inconsistency between methods, however, is not 
uncommon. 
 Schneider and Enste (2000) compare world estimates for shadow economy size across 
various estimation techniques. They, too, find inconsistent results between methods. For 
example, average electricity consumption estimates around the year 1990 for the Central and 
South American countries of Brazil, Chile, Columbia, and Costa Rica suggest these countries’ 
shadow economies were approximately 29.0, 37.0, 25.0, and 34.0% of GDP, respectively (table 
4). Conversely, MIMIC estimates for these same countries suggested shadow economy sizes 
close to 37.8, 18.2, 35.1, and 23.2% of GDP, respectively (table 4). Not only do these estimates 
lack similarity in terms of shadow economy size, the rank order of the estimates also change. 
While there is no consensus on the best method for evaluating shadow economy size, the 
MIMIC approach has dominated the literature for nearly two decades. One significant advantage 
that the MIMIC model holds over other estimation techniques is that it is an inherently more 
flexible estimation technique (Schneider, 2010a). The MIMIC model allows the researcher to (i) 
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consider multiple variables related to shadow economic activity simultaneously, and (ii) vary the 
choice of causal and indicator variables. Single-variable methods such as the electricity 
consumption method are much more limited.  
  
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper evaluates multiple causes and multiple indicators of U.S. state-level underground 
economies using a MIMIC model estimation technique. Based on an index constructed with 
MIMIC model results, I present the first comprehensive estimates of shadow economy size for 
50 U.S. states over the period 1997 to 2008. Shadow economy estimates based on the MIMIC 
index suggest that, on average, Delaware, Oregon, and Colorado maintain the smallest U.S. 
shadow economies, while West Virginia and Mississippi secure the largest as a percent of GDP. 
A cursory look at U.S. contiguous regions reveals that, on average, the shadow economies of 
southern states are largest (8.48% of GDP) across the period. Western states maintain the 
smallest shadow economies (on average 8.11%). The sizes of all state shadow economies, 
however, appear to have decreased over the period. 
 Interestingly, high-income states tend to have the smallest relative shadow economies, 
but the highest underground GDP on a per capita basis. I speculate that this is likely due to a 
couple of factors: (1) relative scarcity of underground services provided in high-income states, 
which results in underground participants’ ability to command higher prices, and/or (2) a lower 
level of human capital stock, and hence lower informal productivity in states with larger shadow 
economies (as a percent of GDP). Without reliable data on informal economy participation at the 
state-level, however, it is hard to say what is driving the high-income, small shadow economy 
trade-off.  
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 MIMIC model results suggest that tax and social welfare burdens, labor market 
regulations, and intensity of regulation enforcement are statistically significant determinants of 
the underground economy. Specifically, I find that U.S. shadow economy estimates rely 
positively on measures of tax and social welfare burdens, and government size, and negatively 
on measures of intensity of regulation enforcement. Perhaps most interesting, however, are the 
relationships between the shadow economy size and labor market variables. On one hand, results 
suggest that more labor market freedom (a score based on measures of minimum wage 
legislation, government employment, and union activity) causes lower participation in shadow 
economies. On the other hand, results suggest that higher levels of government insurance trust 
expenditures (an aggregate of expenditures directed toward unemployment, employee retirement, 
and workers’ compensation) as a percent of GDP per capita also causes lower participation in the 
underground. In light of these empirical results, serious political efforts to reduce shadow 
economy size in the states might include reductions in both tax burdens and government 
spending.  
 Though efforts to inspect and regulate underground activity appear to discourage 
informal sector participation, results suggest these methods might be less effective than efforts to 
reduce fiscal burden. Furthermore, while government spending on unemployment, employee 
retirement, and workers’ compensation appear to reduce the size of underground economies, 
these effects may be as short-lived as the benefits of the programs themselves. Examining the life 
of these effects, however, falls outside the scope of this chapter.   
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FIGURE 2.1 – RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INDIRECT TAX (% GDP) AND INDICATOR VARIABLES 
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FIGURE 2.2 – MIMIC MODEL PATH DIAGRAM 
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FIGURE 2.3 – REAL GDP PER CAPITA AGAINST SHADOW ECONOMY SIZE 
 
 
FIGURE 2.4 – REAL GDP AGAINST SHADOW ECONOMY SIZE 
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FIGURE 2.5 – SHADOW ECONOMY VALUE PER CAPITA AGAINST SHADOW ECONOMY SIZE 
 
 
FIGURE 2.6 – PERCENT OF POPULATION WITH A BACHELOR’S DEGREE OR HIGHER AGAINST INSTITUTIONAL 
QUALITY 
 
 
 
 35 
 
FIGURE 2.7 – PERCENT OF POPULATION WITH A BACHELOR’S DEGREE OR HIGHER AGAINST SHADOW ECONOMY 
SIZE  
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TABLE 2.1 – VARIABLES, DESCRIPTIONS, AND SOURCES 
 
Variable 
 
Obs. 
 
Mean 
 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
 
Description 
       
Government 
Size: EFNA2 
600 7.16 0.94 2.5 9.1 A score composed of general government 
consumption expenditures; transfers and 
subsidies; and social security payments, each of 
these measured as a percent of GDP. Score range 
is 1 to 10, with 10 representing small government. 
 
Government Size 
(alternative 
measure)1 
 
600 12.74 3.16 7.92 26.30 Government consumption expenditures as a 
percent of GDP. 
 
 
Disability 
Benefits6 
550 1.84 0.75 0.81 4.20 Percent of state population receiving supplemental 
security income benefits for disability. 
 
Indirect Tax 
Revenue1 
 
600 2.67 0.94 0.38 5.17 General and selective sales tax revenue as a 
percent of GDP. 
 
Charges1 600 1.17 0.45 0.44 2.76 Revenue from current charges (user fees and 
fines) as a percent of GDP. 
 
Labor Market 
Freedom2 
600 7.19 0.54 5.6 8.3 A score based on measures of minimum wage 
legislation, government employment, and union 
activity. Score range is 1 to 10, with 10 
representing a high degree of labor market 
freedom. 
 
Insurance Trust 
Expenditure1 
600 1.28 0.51 0.36 4.03 An aggregate of state-government unemployment 
compensation, employee retirement, and workers’ 
compensation expenditures as a percent of GDP. 
 
Regulation 
Activity1 
600 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.28 “Protective Inspection and Regulation (PIR)” 
expenditure as a percent of GDP. 
 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Rate3 
 
600 67.46 3.87 55.02 75.82 Percent of the non-institutionalized population, 
age 16+, who are part of the labor force 
(employed and unemployed) 
Growth in Labor 
Force 
Participation3 
 
600 1.01 1.05 -4.69 4.95 Growth in labor force participation. 
 
Real GDP Per 
Capita4 
 
600 39,280.04 7,463.54 25,200.00 65,476.00 GDP per capita in constant (2005) U.S. dollars. 
 
Electricity5 600 3.75 1.49 1.27 8.10 Electricity (hundreds of kilowatt hours) consumed 
as a proportion of GDP. 
 
       
Sources:  
1. State & Local Government Finances, U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau 
2. Economic Freedom of North America, 2011, Fraser Institute 
3. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor and Statistics 
4. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
5. U.S. Energy Information Administration 
6. Social Security Administration 
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TABLE 2.2 – MIMIC MODEL REGRESSION RESULTS, 1997-2008 
Latent Variable: Shadow Economy 
Independent Variables 
   
 
Causal                                                     Specifications: 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Government Size: EFNA Component 1 (-) 
 
-0.379*** 
(9.69) 
 
- 
 
- 
Government Size: Government Consumption (% GDP) (+) - 0.019 
(0.51) 
- 
Disability Benefits (% Population): - - 0.263*** 
(7.35) 
Indirect Tax Revenue (% GDP) (+) 0.206*** 
(7.64) 
0.305*** 
(9.37) 
0.252*** 
(8.39) 
Charges (% GDP) 0.068*** 
(2.48) 
0.213*** 
(6.33) 
0.222*** 
(7.52) 
Labor Market Freedom: EFNA Component 3 (+/-)1 -0.069** 
(2.41) 
- - 
Insurance Trust Expenditures (% GDP) (+/-)1 -0.200*** 
(6.35) 
-0.031 
(0.92) 
-0.085*** 
(2.79) 
Regulation Activity (-) -0.054** 
(2.12) 
-0.073*** 
(2.59) 
 
-0.059** 
(2.03) 
Indicators:     
 
Growth in Labor Force Participation (-) 
 
-0.033 
(0.53) 
 
-0.032 
(0.52) 
 
-0.057 
(0.90) 
Real GDP Per Capita (-) -1.294*** 
(15.93) 
-1.361*** 
(12.51) 
-1.186*** 
(14.82) 
Electricity (+) 
 
1 1 1 
Statistics    
 
Chi-Square 
Degrees of Freedom (df) 
(p-value) 
 
16.27 
df = 12  
(0.179) 
 
11.37 
df = 10 
(0.329) 
 
29.25 
df = 10 
(0.001) 
RMSEA  
(p-close) Probability RMSEA <= 0.05 
0.024 
(0.940) 
0.015 
(0.961) 
0.059 
(0.242) 
R2 0.521 0.331 0.476 
Observations2 600 600 550 
    
    
Notes: Absolute z-statistics are in parentheses below parameter estimates. Expected signs are in parentheses 
accompanying variable names. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. All variables are standardized. Thus, all causal variable coefficients can be interpreted as standard 
deviations from the latent variable mean. Alternatively, indicator coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of 
shadow economy size on the indicator (see equation 2.1) in terms of standard deviation from the mean. The 
electricity variable has been chosen as the fixed, a-priori value indicator to satisfy the MIMIC model identification 
rule (see Section 3). The degrees of freedom are determined by 0.5(p+q)(p+q+1) – t, where p is the number of 
indicators; q is the number of causes, and t is the number of free parameters (Schneider et al., 2010).  
1. Ambiguous expectation (see Section 2) 
2. The “Protective Inspection and Regulation” figures are not available for years 2001 and 2003. I have filled 
in the missing values with averages for years 2000/2002 and 2002/2004, respectively.    
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TABLE 2.3 – U.S. STATE-LEVEL SHADOW ECONOMY ESTIMATES, (% GDP), 1997-2008, MIMIC METHOD 
               
 Years   
State 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
State 
Avg. 
State 
Rank 
              
 
Alabama 9.52 9.56 9.35 9.39 9.42 9.43 9.20 9.10 8.86 8.09 7.86 7.72 8.96 45 
Alaska 8.28 8.53 8.53 8.50 8.59 8.64 8.09 7.73 7.87 6.97 6.80 6.49 7.92 13 
Arizona 8.77 8.75 8.55 8.62 8.57 8.64 8.42 8.35 8.09 7.38 7.09 7.01 8.19 21 
Arkansas 9.35 9.43 9.25 9.26 9.34 9.41 9.10 9.00 8.86 8.17 7.91 7.74 8.90 44 
California 8.44 8.44 8.24 8.13 8.16 8.05 7.83 7.64 7.47 6.76 6.45 6.33 7.66 4 
Colorado 8.21 8.30 8.03 8.00 7.95 7.89 7.65 7.55 7.30 6.66 6.39 6.27 7.52 3 
Connecticut 8.44 8.52 8.31 8.21 8.23 8.19 7.99 7.92 7.73 6.91 6.62 6.61 7.81 7 
Delaware 7.86 7.89 7.73 7.67 7.68 7.70 7.45 7.37 7.14 6.50 6.24 6.17 7.28 1 
Florida 9.36 9.35 9.07 9.09 8.97 8.96 8.70 8.58 8.30 7.73 7.50 7.41 8.59 40 
Georgia 8.55 8.47 8.24 8.21 8.25 8.27 8.05 7.97 7.78 7.10 6.82 6.64 7.86 10 
Hawaii 9.69 9.73 9.47 9.50 9.55 9.44 9.28 9.10 8.94 8.29 7.96 7.82 9.06 47 
Idaho 9.05 9.09 8.82 8.74 8.82 8.88 8.58 8.45 8.15 7.41 7.17 7.03 8.35 30 
Illinois 8.37 8.40 8.21 8.22 8.24 8.23 7.98 7.88 7.77 7.03 6.74 6.74 7.82 9 
Indiana 8.81 8.81 8.60 8.65 8.68 8.70 8.54 8.47 8.36 7.89 7.32 7.32 8.35 28 
Iowa 9.05 9.12 8.96 8.75 8.85 8.85 8.46 8.24 8.08 7.44 7.00 7.01 8.32 27 
Kansas 8.91 8.92 8.76 8.64 8.66 8.68 8.49 8.39 8.22 7.49 7.22 7.09 8.29 24 
Kentucky 9.05 9.09 8.72 8.93 8.96 8.96 8.74 8.61 8.50 7.82 7.43 7.66 8.54 38 
Louisiana 9.03 9.11 8.98 8.96 8.97 8.99 8.61 8.35 8.05 7.96 7.17 7.05 8.44 34 
Maine 9.35 9.52 9.20 9.05 9.14 9.17 9.01 8.98 8.81 8.14 7.82 7.65 8.82 43 
Maryland 9.13 9.12 8.90 8.92 8.90 8.83 8.69 8.60 8.27 7.83 7.36 7.28 8.49 35 
Massachusetts 8.60 8.56 8.32 8.24 8.31 8.19 8.04 7.99 7.83 7.15 6.80 6.78 7.90 12 
Michigan 8.91 8.99 8.68 8.71 8.76 8.76 8.58 8.51 8.36 7.69 7.45 7.51 8.41 32 
Minnesota 8.67 8.57 8.36 8.33 8.32 8.22 8.02 7.90 7.73 7.06 6.85 6.63 7.89 11 
Mississippi 9.78 9.93 9.83 9.96 9.98 10.00 9.71 9.49 9.48 9.61 8.53 8.19 9.54 50 
Missouri 8.85 8.92 8.70 8.65 8.69 8.72 8.49 8.39 8.24 7.54 7.30 7.14 8.30 26 
Montana 9.25 9.29 9.31 9.18 9.23 9.25 8.88 8.61 8.35 7.60 7.20 7.06 8.60 41 
Nebraska 8.88 8.90 8.68 8.71 8.72 8.81 8.62 8.44 8.23 7.46 7.07 7.03 8.30 25 
Nevada 8.61 8.59 8.34 8.41 8.45 8.36 8.13 8.00 7.82 7.13 6.83 6.70 7.95 15 
New Hampshire 8.35 8.38 8.12 8.11 8.15 8.15 7.97 7.78 7.67 6.95 6.74 6.66 7.75 6 
New Jersey 8.31 8.41 8.16 8.12 8.08 7.97 7.79 7.69 7.52 6.83 6.58 6.52 7.67 5 
New Mexico 9.59 9.82 9.55 9.60 9.69 9.57 9.28 9.09 8.88 8.13 7.93 7.82 9.08 48 
New York 8.60 8.64 8.38 8.33 8.35 8.28 8.15 8.12 7.86 7.14 6.89 6.71 7.95 16 
North Carolina 8.53 8.59 8.26 8.33 8.32 8.31 8.09 8.06 7.85 7.13 6.88 6.74 7.93 14 
North Dakota 9.75 9.64 9.62 9.58 9.65 9.79 9.28 8.87 8.71 7.97 7.53 7.32 8.98 46 
 39 
 
Ohio 8.42 8.35 8.17 8.17 8.19 8.11 7.92 7.85 7.75 7.11 7.03 6.71 7.81 8 
Oklahoma 9.07 9.15 8.92 8.85 8.98 9.07 8.70 8.44 8.22 7.49 7.20 6.99 8.42 33 
              
 
(Continued) 
TABLE 2.3 – U.S. STATE-LEVEL SHADOW ECONOMY ESTIMATES (% GDP), 1997-2008, MIMIC METHOD 
(Continued) 
              
 
 Years   
State 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
State 
Avg. 
State 
Rank 
              
 
Oregon 8.22 8.10 7.98 7.90 7.98 7.91 7.52 7.31 7.22 6.52 6.22 6.05 7.41 2 
Pennsylvania 8.90 8.96 8.74 8.82 8.86 8.77 8.51 8.40 8.26 7.51 7.29 7.14 8.35 29 
Rhode Island 8.93 9.00 8.72 8.77 8.71 8.45 8.21 8.12 7.98 7.39 7.09 6.97 8.20 22 
South Carolina 9.10 9.11 8.86 8.92 8.96 8.87 8.65 8.55 8.41 7.78 7.61 7.43 8.52 37 
South Dakota 9.28 9.25 9.07 9.02 9.02 8.95 8.63 8.47 8.35 7.73 7.35 7.11 8.52 36 
Tennessee 9.11 9.08 8.85 8.93 8.92 8.95 8.82 8.70 8.54 7.78 7.49 7.51 8.56 39 
Texas 8.61 8.65 8.47 8.39 8.46 8.37 8.13 7.99 7.77 7.10 6.76 6.77 7.95 17 
Utah 8.77 8.80 8.62 8.60 8.62 8.65 8.40 8.28 8.08 7.30 7.01 6.78 8.16 20 
Vermont 9.10 9.18 9.05 9.09 9.14 9.16 8.93 8.94 8.88 8.25 8.02 7.94 8.81 42 
Virginia 9.06 9.02 8.74 8.71 8.76 8.73 8.51 8.46 8.23 7.55 7.30 7.19 8.36 31 
Washington 8.86 8.85 8.53 8.60 8.68 8.56 8.43 8.37 8.16 7.51 7.21 7.02 8.23 23 
West Virginia 9.74 9.80 9.61 9.72 9.73 9.32 9.32 9.47 9.53 8.86 8.42 8.32 9.32 49 
Wisconsin 8.67 8.71 8.53 8.54 8.42 8.42 8.21 8.13 7.92 7.23 6.98 6.83 8.05 18 
Wyoming 8.64 8.89 8.67 8.71 8.64 8.67 8.33 8.20 7.95 7.18 6.78 6.70 8.11 19 
               
U.S. Average 8.89 8.93 8.72 8.71 8.73 8.71 8.46 8.34 8.17 7.51 7.18 7.07   
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TABLE 2.4 – U.S. STATE-LEVEL RANK BY GDP PER CAPITA 
State 
Shadow Economy 
GDP Excluded 
Shadow Economy 
GDP Included 
Change in 
Rank 
    
Alabama 45 45 0 
Alaska 2 2 0 
Arizona 37 37 0 
Arkansas 48 48 0 
California 10 11 -1 
Colorado 8 8 0 
Connecticut 3 3 0 
Delaware 1 1 0 
Florida 38 38 0 
Georgia 19 20 -1 
Hawaii 16 15 1 
Idaho 46 46 0 
Illinois 11 13 -2 
Indiana 31 31 0 
Iowa 26 26 0 
Kansas 30 29 1 
Kentucky 43 43 0 
Louisiana 18 18 0 
Maine 41 41 0 
Maryland 17 17 0 
Massachusetts 5 5 0 
Michigan 33 33 0 
Minnesota 14 14 0 
Mississippi 50 50 0 
Missouri 32 32 0 
Montana 47 47 0 
Nebraska 20 19 1 
Nevada 9 9 0 
New Hampshire 21 21 0 
New Jersey 6 6 0 
New Mexico 40 40 0 
New York 7 7 0 
North Carolina 22 22 0 
North Dakota 34 34 0 
Ohio 27 28 -1 
Oklahoma 42 42 0 
Oregon 29 30 -1 
    
      (Continued) 
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TABLE 2.4 – U.S. STATE-LEVEL RANK BY GDP PER CAPITA (Continued) 
State 
Shadow Economy 
GDP Excluded 
Shadow Economy 
GDP Included 
Change in 
Rank 
    
Pennsylvania 28 27 1 
Rhode Island 23 23 0 
South Carolina 44 44 0 
South Dakota 25 24 1 
Tennessee 36 35 1 
Texas 15 16 -1 
Utah 35 36 -1 
Vermont 39 39 0 
Virginia 12 10 2 
Washington 13 12 1 
West Virginia 49 49 0 
Wisconsin 24 25 -1 
Wyoming 4 4 0 
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TABLE 2.5 – U.S. STATE-LEVEL SHADOW ECONOMY ESTIMATES, (% GDP), 1997-2008, ELECTRICITY 
CONSUMPTION METHOD 
               
 Years   
State 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
State 
Avg. 
State 
Rank 
              
 
Alabama 8.57 9.11 8.74 8.89 8.12 8.32 8.27 8.15 8.39 8.88 9.26 10.01 8.73 47 
Alaska 8.54 9.53 9.48 8.99 9.02 8.60 8.19 7.99 7.92 8.23 8.17 8.09 8.56 44 
Arizona 8.33 7.75 7.25 7.18 6.97 6.66 6.49 6.47 6.32 6.39 6.64 6.95 6.95 2 
Arkansas 8.66 8.40 7.77 8.00 8.09 7.28 6.96 6.66 7.46 7.91 7.63 7.95 7.73 25 
California 8.64 7.76 7.07 7.13 8.46 8.43 7.97 7.37 7.06 7.59 7.31 7.12 7.66 24 
Colorado 8.05 7.82 7.28 6.84 6.85 6.88 7.65 7.52 7.96 7.68 7.67 8.32 7.54 20 
Connecticut 8.09 7.69 7.34 6.37 6.37 6.51 6.79 6.41 7.44 8.26 9.41 9.30 7.50 19 
Delaware 8.75 8.38 8.32 6.96 7.35 7.88 7.66 7.21 7.12 8.61 9.40 10.39 8.17 39 
Florida 8.50 8.31 7.52 7.42 8.07 7.59 7.73 7.58 7.65 8.69 8.35 8.64 8.00 35 
Georgia 8.24 8.37 7.53 7.49 7.33 7.31 7.14 7.40 8.09 8.08 8.08 8.84 7.82 29 
Hawaii 8.88 8.13 8.25 9.55 9.40 8.57 9.09 9.39 9.94 10.55 10.33 13.60 9.64 50 
Idaho 8.50 8.25 7.55 7.14 7.72 8.31 7.58 6.55 6.07 5.85 5.84 6.51 7.16 5 
Illinois 8.37 8.01 7.15 6.83 6.68 6.68 6.23 5.98 6.12 5.76 6.83 7.34 6.83 1 
Indiana 8.46 8.23 8.22 7.68 7.78 7.80 7.33 7.43 7.85 8.26 8.17 8.73 8.00 34 
Iowa 8.70 8.88 8.51 8.17 8.47 8.19 7.89 7.37 7.77 7.99 7.49 7.60 8.09 37 
Kansas 8.25 8.25 7.71 7.81 7.42 7.49 7.14 7.01 7.21 7.27 6.70 6.98 7.44 15 
Kentucky 8.19 7.98 7.94 7.91 7.97 8.39 8.21 8.32 8.86 9.05 9.88 10.51 8.60 46 
Louisiana 8.27 7.83 7.68 8.41 7.95 7.17 7.28 6.95 6.57 6.55 6.71 7.25 7.39 11 
Maine 8.62 8.08 7.82 7.37 7.67 6.72 6.40 6.10 6.49 6.91 8.03 7.42 7.30 7 
Maryland 8.17 7.94 7.65 7.04 6.52 6.41 6.65 6.46 7.08 7.65 8.79 9.32 7.47 18 
Massachusetts 8.56 7.51 6.74 6.80 8.15 7.10 7.47 7.39 8.21 9.80 9.41 9.62 8.06 36 
Michigan 8.34 8.32 8.12 7.82 7.49 7.47 7.28 7.16 7.53 8.28 8.55 9.07 7.95 33 
Minnesota 8.41 8.17 7.95 7.67 7.71 7.36 7.35 7.15 7.57 7.85 8.28 8.45 7.83 30 
Mississippi 8.43 8.64 8.02 8.32 8.46 8.40 8.19 8.56 8.77 9.43 8.63 9.26 8.59 45 
Missouri 8.35 8.36 7.95 7.90 7.79 7.77 7.30 7.03 7.49 7.55 7.89 7.82 7.77 27 
Montana 8.00 8.38 7.86 8.38 7.96 7.61 7.58 7.36 7.44 7.31 7.83 8.20 7.83 31 
Nebraska 9.03 9.07 8.59 8.63 8.56 8.89 8.39 8.08 8.33 8.24 8.24 8.48 8.54 43 
Nevada 8.13 7.90 7.71 7.92 9.89 10.53 9.88 9.33 8.92 9.41 9.34 9.22 9.02 48 
New Hampshire 8.28 8.08 8.04 7.24 7.07 6.56 6.80 6.78 7.34 7.68 7.61 7.71 7.43 14 
New Jersey 8.29 7.97 7.73 6.71 6.66 6.52 6.54 6.90 7.38 7.42 8.08 8.63 7.40 12 
New Mexico 8.26 8.73 7.97 8.06 8.45 7.89 7.64 7.13 7.44 7.18 7.24 7.77 7.81 28 
New York 8.24 7.68 7.15 7.78 7.61 7.39 7.87 7.54 8.09 7.80 7.75 8.18 7.76 26 
North Carolina 8.08 7.89 7.22 7.14 6.94 7.08 6.93 6.92 6.71 6.50 6.72 6.55 7.06 4 
North Dakota 8.82 8.24 8.71 8.40 8.43 8.15 7.61 7.62 7.73 7.98 7.98 7.77 8.12 38 
Ohio 8.18 8.00 7.94 7.62 7.38 7.14 6.84 6.78 6.98 7.15 7.51 7.87 7.45 16 
               
(Continued) 
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TABLE 2.5 – U.S. STATE-LEVEL SHADOW ECONOMY ESTIMATES (% GDP), 1997-2008, ELECTRICITY 
CONSUMPTION METHOD (Continued) 
              
 
 Years   
State 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
State 
Avg. 
State 
Rank 
              
 
Oklahoma 8.31 8.76 7.99 8.67 8.48 7.58 8.32 8.01 8.31 8.26 7.77 7.78 8.19 40 
Oregon 7.91 7.77 7.55 7.42 7.57 8.20 7.67 6.99 6.96 6.61 6.90 6.86 7.37 10 
Pennsylvania 8.44 7.91 6.86 7.28 7.50 7.49 7.17 6.99 7.15 7.03 7.29 7.24 7.36 9 
Rhode Island 8.45 7.36 6.70 7.29 7.84 5.91 6.54 6.57 7.12 7.69 7.28 8.68 7.29 6 
South Carolina 8.22 8.22 7.84 7.93 7.59 7.70 7.57 7.79 8.15 8.01 7.88 8.41 7.94 32 
South Dakota 8.78 8.28 8.03 7.70 7.69 7.12 7.00 6.81 7.21 7.33 7.35 7.39 7.56 21 
Tennessee 8.30 8.77 8.39 8.30 8.05 8.00 7.80 7.88 8.05 8.47 8.60 9.51 8.34 41 
Texas 8.23 8.17 7.59 7.91 8.65 7.60 8.26 7.90 8.91 9.54 8.52 8.89 8.35 42 
Utah 8.35 7.77 7.31 7.16 7.42 7.46 7.36 7.51 7.23 6.94 7.26 7.11 7.41 13 
Vermont 8.60 8.17 8.35 7.95 7.98 7.72 7.05 7.03 6.97 6.86 7.23 7.13 7.59 22 
Virginia 8.34 7.70 7.26 7.11 6.89 6.97 6.68 6.64 6.53 6.29 6.57 7.15 7.01 3 
Washington 8.09 7.79 7.45 7.40 7.34 7.54 7.48 7.24 7.04 6.99 6.72 6.87 7.33 8 
West Virginia 8.24 8.13 7.96 8.01 7.69 7.70 7.44 7.15 7.03 6.91 7.54 7.75 7.63 23 
Wisconsin 8.53 8.67 8.52 8.63 8.89 9.12 9.31 9.24 9.96 10.28 10.60 11.09 9.40 49 
Wyoming 8.96 8.72 8.17 7.99 7.79 7.91 7.52 7.26 6.93 6.30 5.98 5.97 7.46 17 
               
U.S. Average 8.40 8.20 7.81 7.73 7.80 7.62 7.51 7.34 7.58 7.78 7.90 8.27   
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TABLE 2.6 – EXAMPLE OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION METHOD CALCULATION:  
ALABAMA’S SHADOW ECONOMY 
              
              
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  
              
Percent Growth in Shadow 
Economy Size 
(based on difference in 
GDP and Electricity 
Consumption growth rates) 
-0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.02 -0.09 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.08 
 
Baseline Shadow Economy Estimate, 1996 (Schneider, 2010b): 8.85 
              
Shadow Economy  
Size, % GDP 
8.57 9.11 8.74 8.89 8.12 8.32 8.27 8.15 8.39 8.88 9.26 10.01 
 
              
              
Notes: Schneider (2010b) provides shadow economy size estimates for 1995 and 1997. The 1996 baseline estimate 
used here is an average of the 1995 and 1997 values. Shadow economy growth rates represent growth from the 
previous year (e.g., 1997 growth rate is the growth in shadow economy size from the 1996 value). The 1997 shadow 
economy size (% GDP) is calculated as the 1996 baseline estimate multiplied by the aggregate of 1 plus the 1997 
growth rate, for example: 8.85*(1-0.032) = 8.57; for 1998: 8.57*1.06 = 9.11, and so on. 
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Appendix: Chapter 2 
Census Bureau’s Classification Manual entry for “Protective Inspection and Regulation,” 
(abbreviated by Campbell, et al., 2010) 
“DEFINITION: Regulation and inspection of private establishments for the protection of the 
public or to prevent hazardous conditions NOT classified under another major function.” 
“EXAMPLES: Inspection of plans, permits, construction, or installations related to buildings, 
housing, plumbing, electric power plant sites, nuclear facilities, weights and measures, etc.; 
regulation of financial institutions, taxicabs, public service corporations, insurance 
companies, private utilities (telephone, electric, etc.), and other corporations; licensing, 
examination, and regulation of professional occupations, including health-related ones like 
doctors, nurses, barber, beauticians, etc.; inspection and regulation or working conditions and 
occupational hazards; motor vehicle inspection and weighing unless handled by a police 
agency; regulation and enforcement of liquor laws and sale of alcoholic beverages unless 
handled by a police department.” 
“EXCLUSIONS: Distinctive license revenue collection activities…; regulatory or inspection 
activities related to food establishments or to environmental health…; motor vehicle 
inspection, liquor law enforcement, and other regulatory type activities of police agencies…; 
regulatory and inspection activities related to other major functions, such as fire inspections, 
health permits, water permits, and the like…” (pp. 170-171)23 
 
  
                                                 
23
 The authors also offer a link to the manual: http://www.census.gov/govs/www/classfunc66.html 
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Chapter 3  
Entrepreneurship, Corruption, and the Size of 
U.S. Underground Economies 
 
“In those corrupted governments where there is at least a general suspicion of 
much unnecessary expence, and great misapplication of the public revenue, the 
laws which guard it are little respected. Not many people are scrupulous about 
smuggling, when, without perjury, they can find any easy and safe opportunity of 
doing so.” 
 
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book V, Chapter II, Part II, Article IV 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Institutions play an important role in the functioning of an economy. Studies show that high 
quality institutions promote economic growth and prosperity. Alternatively, where low quality 
institutions are in place, growth and prosperity are often diminished. Much of the empirical study 
of institutions and economic outcomes concentrates on measures of formal economic activity. 
However, where institutions make participation in the formal sector difficult, entrepreneurs will 
most often turn their productive efforts to underground markets (see deSoto, 1989, 2000; 
Neuwirth, 2011). Thus, there exists a trade-off between formal and informal sector 
entrepreneurial activity that hinges, perhaps, on institutional quality.  
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A recent study by Wiseman and Young (2012a) suggests that the effects of institutions on 
income levels are channeled through entrepreneurship. This is consistent with William Baumol’s 
(1990) thesis in which he argues that entrepreneurs concentrate their efforts differently in 
different institutional environments. Specifically, Baumol contends that productive entrepreneurs 
exploit institutions that reward wealth-creation; unproductive entrepreneurs exploit institutions 
that reward rent-seeking behavior. Regardless of the majority entrepreneurial type at work in the 
formal sector, their decisions to pursue profits, be it in the Knightian (1921), Schumpeterian 
(1934, 1942), or Kirznerian (1973, 1979) entrepreneurial sense, begin with an assessment of the 
institutional framework.
24
  
Existing empirical studies of productive and unproductive entrepreneurial outcomes 
focus exclusively on the formal economy (see, e.g., Sobel, 2008; Wiseman and Young, 2012a, 
2012b), and for good reason. Informal (or shadow) economic activity is deliberately undertaken 
in a way that escapes detection by public officials.
25
 Shadow economy participants’ desire to 
remain undetected makes the researcher’s task of measuring shadow activity particularly 
difficult. This means, too, that total entrepreneurial activity is at all times unobservable. Recent 
studies, however, have made data available at the U.S. state-level for both shadow economy size 
(Wiseman, 2012) and formal sector productive and unproductive entrepreneurial outcomes 
(Sobel, 2008; Wiseman and Young, 2012b). In light of this, I endeavor to take a closer look at 
the relationship between informal economies and Baumolian (1990) entrepreneurial outcomes. 
                                                 
24
 Frank Knight (1921) defended the entrepreneur as a person capable of pursuing profits while simultaneously 
assessing risk (measurable) and bearing psychological costs of uncertainty (immeasurable); Joseph Schumpeter 
(1934, 1942) viewed entrepreneurs as innovators who open new markets via the introduction of new goods or 
methods of production; Israel Kirzner (1973, 1979) stressed the importance of an acute alertness to profit 
opportunity as a defining characteristic of entrepreneurship. 
25
 While this definition potentially includes both activity that is illegal generally and that which would be legal if not 
purposefully hidden – by this definition, dealers of illegal narcotics and under-the-table moonlighters both contribute 
to the underground economy – the empirical methodology used to estimate the shadow economy measures used in 
this study focuses more narrowly on otherwise legal market activity. More details follow in section 2. 
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A question that comes to mind concerning Baumol’s productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurial hypothesis is: What becomes of otherwise productive entrepreneurs who reside 
in (perhaps changing) institutional environments that largely (change to) reward unproductive 
activity? Productive entrepreneurs in the formal sector may of course choose to bear the full 
costs of an unfavorable institutional adjustment by continuing to behave the same as before. 
However, other plausible options include (1) productive formal activity in a new location: the 
entrepreneur may choose to migrate to other states or regions with institutions more favorable for 
wealth-creation; (2) unproductive formal activity: otherwise productive entrepreneurs re-focus 
some portion of their efforts to legal, unproductive activity (e.g., rent-seeking); (3) productive 
informal activity: entrepreneurs migrate to the underground economy to engage in wealth-
creation; and (4) unproductive informal activity: entrepreneurs migrate to the underground 
economy to engage in some combination of more or less abrasive measures such as (i) thievery 
(more abrasive), and/or (ii) off-the-books transactions with corrupt public officials (less 
abrasive); the latter of the activities undertaken to secure privileges in the formal sector (see, e.g., 
Dreher and Schneider, 2010).  
I focus primarily on option (3) and the less abrasive counterpart of option (4) in this study 
in order to examine more closely Baumol’s theory. While (1), (2), and the more abrasive 
component of (4) are no less important considerations, a closer examination of these options is 
too broad to cover here. 
Baumol’s (1990) central hypothesis states that “it is the set of rules and not the supply of 
entrepreneurs or the nature of their objectives that undergoes significant changes from one 
period to another and helps to dictate the ultimate effect on the economy via the allocation of 
entrepreneurial resources” (p. 849, emphasis his). Here, I take the unchanging “nature of their 
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objectives” to imply, first, the entrepreneur’s profit motive, but also their means of acquiring 
profit. For the purpose of this study, I rest on the assumptions that, as the result of institutional 
change, entrepreneurs neither change in terms of supply (i.e., they do not likely migrate; they do 
not cease being entrepreneurial) nor do they entirely re-focus their efforts (e.g., productive 
entrepreneurs do not suddenly become strictly unproductive – formal or informal sector – 
entrepreneurs). In other words, I contend that productive entrepreneurs will remain productive in 
the face of unfavorable institutional change, but that the portion of total productive 
entrepreneurship observed in the formal sector will fall as the rules of the game alter incentives 
to either (i) move productive efforts underground, and/or (ii) remain in the formal sector, but 
channel some effort into establishing relationships with bureaucratic authorities for the purpose 
of securing political favor. On the other hand, unproductive entrepreneurs will likely increase 
their unproductive behavior – in both the formal and informal sectors – under the same 
conditions. 
In this paper I investigate the relationship between public official corruption, shadow 
economy size and formal sector entrepreneurship – both productive and unproductive – using 
cross-sectional data from the 48 contiguous U.S. states.  In doing so, I make several novel 
contributions: (i) I examine the relationship between formal sector entrepreneurship and the 
shadow economy at the U.S. state-level; (ii) I attempt to address the primacy of the shadow 
economy as a channel through which corruption affects observed entrepreneurial outcomes. 
What I mean by shadow economy as a channel is that entrepreneurs make a choice between 
formal and informal sector participation based on institutional change (in this case changing 
levels of corruption). Shadow economy estimates serve as a proxy for that choice. Their decision 
will be revealed in observed (formal sector) entrepreneurial outcomes. Therefore, the choice of 
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going formal versus informal (proxied for by shadow economy size) is a channel through which 
corruption affects formal entrepreneurial activity.   
I tackle each of these tasks using a unique dataset constructed with U.S. state-level 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship scores from Sobel (2008), and Wiseman and 
Young (2012b), and shadow economy estimates from Wiseman (2012). I discuss this data in the 
next section. 
First, I establish that formal sector entrepreneurial activity is strongly linked to U.S. state-
level shadow economy size. A negative correlation between the shadow economy and productive 
entrepreneurship that takes place in the formal sector suggests that the above-mentioned 
assumptions are reasonable. If, as a state’s shadow economy size increases, productive 
entrepreneurship in the formal sector decreases, it is plausible that otherwise productive 
entrepreneurs take seriously the option to engage in shadow economic activity. Of course, 
another option is for productive entrepreneurs to remain in the formal sector, but engage in more 
unproductive activity. This is an important consideration to keep in mind.  
Second, I estimate the effects of shadow economy size on the separate formal sector 
productive, unproductive, and net entrepreneurial outcomes using ordinary least squares and a set 
of control variables. Since the shadow economy estimate, by construction, measures otherwise 
legal market activity
26
, I expect a negative relationship between shadow economy size and 
formal productive entrepreneurship. In other words, if the shadow economy is growing, it is 
growing by way of productive activity taking place off-the-books. Alternatively, I expect that 
                                                 
26
 Public official bribery is at all times illegal. The shadow economy estimates, however, are measured in a way that 
does not distinguish between uses of income in the informal sector. This leads to some debate over the idea that the 
estimates capture only otherwise legal market activity (see, e.g., the appendix of Schneider, 2010a). For example, 
shadow incomes could very well fund some portion of the drug trade. The argument for these estimates capturing 
only otherwise legal market activity is founded in the fact that no measures of illegal activity (e.g., corruption, drug 
trade, etc.) are part of their construction (see Wiseman, 2012, section 2). 
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formal unproductive entrepreneurship will correlate positively with shadow economy size. 
Intuitively, as institutions change to favor unproductive entrepreneurship in the formal sector, 
one would expect more of it. Again, in this case, I posit that even otherwise productive 
entrepreneurs may opt to engage in some observable unproductive activity.  
Third, I question the primacy of underground economies in serving as a channel through 
which corruption affects observed (formal sector) entrepreneurship. And, I do so with the 
following theory in mind: as levels of corruption among public officials increase, entrepreneurs 
who may perceive bribe requests and other corrupt behavior as a tax on their productive efforts 
will exploit an option to engage in either the formal or informal economy. Their decision will be 
revealed in the portion of productive entrepreneurial activity that is observed in the formal 
sector. Alternatively, unproductive entrepreneurs may take advantage of corrupt officials to 
secure formal sector wealth transfers and other zero- or negative-sum redistributions via the 
shadow economy. Off-the-books currency transfers could feasibly serve as a means of securing 
these privileges (see, e.g., Dreher and Schneider, 2010). In other words, if the shadow economy 
serves as both a safe haven to which productive entrepreneurs may escape the pressures of 
corrupt officials, and a mechanism through which unproductive entrepreneurs gain formal sector 
privilege, then corruption should correlate with observable entrepreneurial outcomes through its 
effect on the shadow economy. I contend that if this is the case, then estimates of state-level 
corruption should serve as a strong and valid instrument for shadow economy size in a regression 
on observed entrepreneurial outcomes. 
However, it is improbable that corruption affects observed productive (unproductive) 
entrepreneurship only through the shadow economy. Some entrepreneurs will not exploit the 
shadow economy at all. For example, it is possible that entrepreneurs will respond to changes in 
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levels of corruption with adjustments made entirely in the formal sector (e.g., re-focusing their 
efforts between formal productive and formal unproductive activities). For this reason, 
instrument validity is a concern. Fortunately, validity is a null and therefore testable hypothesis.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 discusses related studies; section 
3.3 introduces the data and provides some motivation for the study with a cursory glance at the 
basic relationships between shadow economy size and entrepreneurship, and shadow economy 
size and corruption; section 3.4 provides methodology and results for a more formal empirical 
investigation of these relationships; section 3.5 concludes the study. 
 
3.2  Entrepreneurs and the Shadow Economy 
Recent studies suggest that entrepreneurs view the shadow economy as an escape from 
unfavorable, indeed corrupt, institutional environments (see, e.g., deSoto 1989, 2001; Neuwirth, 
2011; Maloney, 2004). Pressures from corrupt officials only add to the burdens that 
entrepreneurs face when making decisions about their entrepreneurial pursuits. Katsios (2006), in 
a study of corruption in Greece, finds that “the shadow economy and the amount of corruption in 
Greece is closely connected with reflexes of the ‘less privileged’: the ones who are not willing, 
cannot afford or have no connections to central or local government bureaucrats[.]” Further, 
“[the less privileged] are systematically choosing the dark (shadow) side of the economy as a 
substitute for corruption (bribery), making the shadow economy complimentary to a corrupt 
state” (pp. 78). 
Entrepreneurs take extraordinary risk in bringing new, innovative ideas or products to 
market. The entrepreneurial process is undoubtedly one of trial and error. According to 
Javanovic (1982, p. 649), “[f]irms learn about their efficiency as they operate in the industry. 
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The efficient grow and survive; the inefficient decline and fail,” often doomed by lack of 
foresight. Small firms especially experience extraordinarily high rates of failure (Maloney, 
2004). These “trial” costs are not insignificant. Basic start-up costs alone make the shadow 
economy an attractive avenue for entrepreneurs to first try out their innovations, and avoid many 
costs associated with formal sector participation.  
However, adding to information cost and general start-up costs in the formal sector are 
often costs associated with tax compliance, licensing, government social welfare programs, and 
the like. These costs often work to enhance the allure of the shadow economy for entrepreneurs 
(Maloney, 2004; Levenson and Maloney, 1996). Schneider et al. (2010) find, empirically, that 
for 162 (Eastern European, Central Asian, and high-income OECD) countries, increased burdens 
of the above-mentioned type are among the “driving forces of the shadow economy” (pp. 443). 
Similarly, for a panel of 50 U.S. states, Wiseman (2012) finds that larger size of government, tax 
and social welfare burdens, and lower levels of labor market freedom contribute to increased 
shadow economic activity. 
Empirical studies of entrepreneurship and the U.S. shadow economy are scarce. Most 
relevant to my analysis, Estrin and Mickiewicz (2012) provide the first cross-country study, in 
which the U.S. is included, to examine the effect of shadow economy size on entrepreneurial 
entry (i.e. business start-ups) in the formal sector. Using individual-level data from the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) and shadow economy estimates from Schneider and Buehn 
(2009), they find a negative correlation between shadow economy size and (formal) 
entrepreneurship. 
Other studies document a link between corruption and the shadow economy (e.g., Dreher 
and Schneider, 2010; Johnson et al., 1997; Johnson et al. 1998a, 1998b). Probably most relevant 
 54 
 
to my study is the Dreher and Schneider (2010) study in which the authors posit two hypotheses 
concerning the relationship between corruption and the shadow economy, and find some 
empirical support for both. Their first hypothesis suggests that shadow economic activity and 
corruption act as compliments in places with low formal sector incomes. Intuitively, in low 
income places – typically exhibiting relatively higher levels of corruption – participants in the 
informal sector will be more likely to immerse themselves almost entirely in the underground. 
Moreover, shadow economies in these places, while comprising primarily of individuals and 
small firms, are more likely to include large firms. Dreher and Schneider claim that corrupt 
officials and evasive entrepreneurs are more likely to reinforce each other’s’ activity under such 
conditions.  
Their second claim is that shadow economic activity and corruption act as substitutes in 
places with high formal sector incomes. Here, participants will be less likely to fully immerse 
themselves in the underground. Instead, they will work partially in the official economy and 
partially in the shadow economy. Large firms will operate almost entirely in the formal sector. 
Any informal interaction will usually result in an increase in formal activity – e.g., firms may 
bribe officials for large public works’ contract awards. In other words, in high income formal 
economies, underground economy participants are more likely to engage in informal transactions 
primarily to secure the privilege to engage in more formal economic activity. In this case, an 
entrepreneur who catches wind of a corrupt official and exploits their misuse of power may leave 
the informal economy almost entirely to attend to work in the official sector.  
Parts of both hypotheses, I think, are relevant here. Though, their second hypothesis 
applies more generally, as the U.S. certainly qualifies as a high-income nation. If, however, U.S. 
entrepreneurs can be categorized into high and low income groups, then perhaps both of Dreher 
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and Schneider’s hypotheses apply. One can imagine, for example, a low-income entrepreneur in 
the start-up phase of his endeavor (say, a construction company) finding that corruption among 
local public officials is incentive enough to operate his business almost entirely off-the-books. 
Though, as his business grows to a larger, high-income firm, remaining in the informal sector 
may become prohibitively costly. Perhaps his business grows such that he can now afford to (or 
can no longer afford not to) engage with corrupt officials for the purpose of securing formal 
sector privileges.  
Finally, a small group of studies document a link between corruption and 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Tonoyan et al., 2010; Avnimelech et al., 2011). Avnimelech et al. (2010) 
examine the relationship between corruption (perception) levels and “productive” formal sector 
entrepreneurship using a unique cross-country dataset constructed from Linkedin.
27
 The authors 
define productive entrepreneurs as “all [Linkedin] members that defined themselves as founders 
[of a firm]” (pp. 12). They use the Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index 
to capture country-level corruption. Their findings suggest a negative correlation between 
corruption and entrepreneurial outcomes.  
The purpose of this paper is to more formally test the link between corruption, shadow 
economy size, and productive and unproductive entrepreneurial outcomes. I attempt to bring to 
light the importance of the shadow economy as both a potential option for productive 
entrepreneurs who desire to evade corrupt officials, and a place for unproductive entrepreneurs 
engaged with corrupt public officials to secure more formal sector privileges (e.g., wealth 
transfers, labor contracts, etc.). This attempt is based on the claim that if corruption affects 
entrepreneurial outcome through its effect on shadow economy size, then corruption should 
                                                 
27
 Linkedin is a social networking website designed to connect working professionals. Users create profiles that 
include information about past and present employment, including self-employment business ventures, education, 
etc. 
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serve as a strong and valid instrument for shadow economy size in regressions on formal sector 
entrepreneurial outcomes.  
 
3.3 Measuring Corruption, Shadow Economy, and Entrepreneurship 
 
I begin by presenting a cursory glance at the U.S. state-level data on corruption, shadow 
economy size, and entrepreneurship that motivate this study. Corruption data come from the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public 
Integrity Section, 2010 and capture the annual number of corruption convictions of public 
officials in each state. Following Leeson and Sobel (2008), I divide the number of corruption 
convictions by each state’s annual population statistics to arrive at a measure of corruption 
convictions per 100,000 residents. Corruption crimes include convictions for election-related 
crimes (vote fraud and campaign-financing crimes, etc.), and various crimes related to ,for 
example, bribery, embezzlement, unlawful insider deals with private vendors and other public 
officials, extortion, etc. Thus, corruption as it is captured in this data fits the more general 
definition of corruption often cited in the literature. That is, the abuse of public power for private 
gain (Dreher and Schneider, 2010). Additionally, this data differs from corruption data used in 
most other related studies in that it is observed (versus perceived) corruption.  
 Data for shadow economy size come from MIMIC model estimates provided in Wiseman 
(2012). The size of the shadow economy is represented as a proportion of state-level GDP. 
Wiseman’s estimates are founded on methodology that considers multiple indicators and 
multiple causes (MIMIC) of shadow economic activity in a system of equations designed to 
estimate unobserved activity. MIMIC estimation is a commonly used methodology with roots in 
shadow economy estimation dating back to Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984). Friedrich 
 57 
 
Schneider subsequently pioneered much of the work measuring the relationship between shadow 
economies and formal (and informal) institutions, including corruption. His work, spanning more 
than 25 years, has delivered fairly conclusive results; primarily in cross-country studies. There is 
consensus, for example, that shadow economy size is generally smaller in relatively high quality 
institutional environments.
28
  
Wiseman (2012) estimates shadow economy size for the 50 U.S. states (excluding the 
District of Columbia) over the period 1997 to 2008. He finds that measures of government size, 
tax and social welfare burdens, labor market regulations, and intensity of regulation enforcement 
in the official sector are all statistically significant determinants of the underground economy. I 
use these estimates here to evaluate the relationships between corruption, shadow economy size, 
and formal sector entrepreneurship.  
Entrepreneurship scores for each of the 48 contiguous U.S. states come from Wiseman 
and Young (2012b) and are based on Sobel’s (2008) methodology.29 Productive entrepreneurship 
scores are based on per capita venture capital investments, patents per capita, the sole-
proprietorship growth rate, total establishment birth rates, and large (500 employees or more) 
establishment birth rates. Development of a productive entrepreneurship score based on several 
indicators differentiates this analysis from the broader, more general body of entrepreneurship 
literature. Many studies focus on self-employment alone as a proxy for entrepreneurship.
30
 
However, Hurst and Pugsley (2011) use a variety of U.S. survey evidence to demonstrate that the 
self-employed do not fit common concepts of the entrepreneur. Specifically, they are not 
                                                 
28
 See, for example, some recent studies such as Dreher et al. (2009); Dreher and Schneider (2010); Torgler, et al. 
(2011); Schneider (2012); Buehn and Schneider (2012); Buehn (2011); Feld and Schneider (2010). 
29
 For details see Sobel (2008, pp. 646-647; Appendix A). Also, since Sobel’s study is limited to the 48 contiguous 
states, so, too, is this study. 
30
 Recent examples using U.S. data include Hamilton (2000), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), Glaeser 
(2007). 
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particularly innovative nor do their businesses tend to exhibit high rates of growth.
31
 Self-
employment may often also be indicative of poor economic conditions where the opportunity 
cost (in the form of available wage employment) is not high (Rissman, 2003). By focusing on 
multiple indicators of profit-seeking and innovative activity, a broad range of productive (formal 
sector) entrepreneurial activity is captured.  
Unproductive entrepreneurship scores incorporate three measures of per capita political 
and lobbying establishments in a state’s capital. These are based on the number of establishments 
in (i) SIC codes 8650 (political organizations), (ii) SIC codes 8650 and 8690 (membership 
organizations), and (iii) SIC codes 8650, 8690, and 8390 (social services organizations) (Sobel 
and Garrett, 2002). The unproductive entrepreneurship scores are also based on (100 minus) an 
index of liability system quality (the Harris Poll). Data for judicial system quality come from the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s survey-based State Liability Systems Ranking Study (2002-2008). 
Respondents for the survey were drawn from a nationally representative sample of senior 
attorneys at companies with revenues of at least $100 million. Overall scores are based on a 100-
point scale (100=highest quality) and reflect attitudes and perceptions of state liability systems 
based on the following (Taylor, et al., 2002-2010):
32
 
• Tort and Contract Litigation 
• Treatment of Class Action Law Suits 
• Punitive Damages 
• Timeliness of Summary Judgement/Dismissal 
• Discovery 
• Scientific and Technical Evidence 
• Judges’ Impartiality and Competence 
• Juries’ Predictability and Fairness 
 
                                                 
31
 Indeed, Hurst and Pugsley present evidence that the self-employed do not tend to want to be innovative or grow 
their businesses considerably; rather, the non-pecuniary benefits of not working for someone else are their primary 
motivation for being self-employed.  
32
 Since judicial quality data are provided only for years 2002 to 2008, much of the study is limited to this period. 
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Based on these, as the quality of judicial systems rise, judges become more competent, court 
processes take less time, enforcement is strict, and there is a higher likelihood of fines, etc. 
(hence, 100 minus this index value is employed to measure an increase in unproductive activity). 
States that have relatively low Harris Poll scores tend to have high rates of legal fraud and abuse 
in the areas of, e.g., workers compensation, class-action, and medical malpractice. All of these 
measures attempt to gauge the level of resources in a state that are being expended in legal and 
political processes rather than in productive market activities.  
For both productive and unproductive scores, the constituent state-level variables are 
ranked from 1 through 48 from smallest to largest. A state’s score is then the average of rankings 
across the constituent variables.
33
 Net entrepreneurship scores are calculated as the difference 
between productive and unproductive scores (productive – unproductive = net).  
Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationships between productive, unproductive, and net 
entrepreneurship scores and state-level shadow economy size. Shadow economy size is 
correlated significantly and negatively with both productive and net entrepreneurship scores 
(correlations are -10.997 and -16.070, respectively; both significant at the 1 percent level). 
Shadow economy size is correlated significantly and positively with unproductive 
entrepreneurship (the correlation is 5.073; significant at the 5 percent level). Intuitively, these 
raw correlations can be interpreted as the point-change in the relevant entrepreneurship score 
given a 1 percentage point increase in shadow economy size as a percent of GDP. For example, a 
                                                 
33
 For example, a state ranked 23, 45, 20, 25, and 38 in terms of, respectively, per capita venture capital investments, 
patents per capita, sole-proprietorship growth rates, establishment birth rates, and large establishment birth rates 
would have a productive entrepreneurship score of (23 + 45 + 20 + 25 + 38)/5 = 30.20. For more detail on the 
construction of these scores, see Wiseman and Young (2012b) and Sobel (2008). Details on the underlying data for 
the entrepreneurship scores from Wiseman and Young (2012b) are provided in Table 4.1 (p. 94) located in Chapter 
4. 
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1 percentage point increase in shadow economy size is associated with an 11 point decrease in a 
state’s productive entrepreneurship score, on average.  
It is interesting to note that the correlation between shadow economy size and productive 
entrepreneurship is both economically and statistically more significant than the correlation 
between shadow economy size and unproductive entrepreneurship. Also, the effect of the 
shadow economy on net entrepreneurship is negative, suggesting a dominant, negative effect on 
productive entrepreneurship. Perhaps this result lends some support for the claim made in section 
1 that the shadow economy is made up primarily of productive entrepreneurs engaging in 
otherwise legal market activity. Again, it is plausible that unproductive entrepreneurs, too, 
engage in informal markets along with corrupt officials for the purpose of securing official sector 
privileges, or that productive entrepreneurs re-focus some of their efforts to unproductive 
activity. The shadow economy has not yet been looked at in terms of a channel through which 
corruption affects these observed entrepreneurial outcomes. But, if that connection is made, the 
very basic results in Figure 3.1 suggest that perhaps more productive entrepreneurs are choosing 
the shadow economy option for productive informal purposes relative to those choosing to take 
advantage of the shadow economy in order to engage in more unproductive formal sector 
activity.  
Figure 3.2 plots public official corruption convictions (per 100,000 pop.) against the 
entrepreneurship scores. The results are similar to those using shadow economy sizes. Corruption 
is significantly and negatively correlated with both productive and net entrepreneurship scores 
(correlations are -17.218 and -20.149; statistically significant at the 1 percent and 10 percent 
levels, respectively). Corruption is positively correlated with unproductive entrepreneurship 
(correlation is 2.931), but not in a statistically significant way (p-value = 0.667).   
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Figure 3.3 plots the relationship between shadow economy size and public official 
corruption. The relationship is positive (correlation is 1.021) and statistically significant at the 5 
percent level.  
Based on these basic correlations, in the next section I move on to regression analysis in 
which I examine these relationships more closely using additional controls. Controls include 
2005 data from the U.S. Census Bureau on state population density, median age of the citizenry, 
percent of the population with at least a bachelor’s degree, and percent of the population that is 
male. Summary statistics and data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
 
3.4 Results 
 
Effects of Shadow Economy Size on Entrepreneurship 
I begin with the following empirical framework:  
 
 
                                                             ,  (3.1) 
 
 
where ES represents productive, unproductive, and net entrepreneurship scores; Shadow 
represents shadow economy size (% GDP). The remaining RHS control variables are 2005 
estimates of population density, median age, percent of population with at least a bachelor’s 
degree (College), and percent of the population that is male.    is the coefficient estimate of 
interest.  
 Columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 3.2 contain the results of OLS regressions from equation 
(3.1) using the productive, unproductive, and net entrepreneurship scores, respectively, as 
dependent variables. The signs remain unchanged from the correlations reported in Figure 3.1. 
Further, the effect of shadow economy size on each of the entrepreneurship scores appears to be 
both statistically and economically significant. Shadow economy size is significantly and 
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negatively correlated with both productive (column 1) and net entrepreneurship (column 3) 
scores (correlations are -7.189 and -15.046, respectively; both significant at the 1 percent level). 
Column 2 exhibits a positive correlation (7.857) between shadow economy size and 
unproductive entrepreneurship; statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Intuitively, these 
correlations suggest the approximate point-change in entrepreneurship scores given an increase 
in shadow economy size by a sample standard deviation (0.59). For example, column 1 suggests 
a sample standard deviation increase in shadow economy size is associated with about a 7 point 
decrease in productive entrepreneurship, on average. 
The next step in the analysis approaches the question: does corruption affect 
entrepreneurship primarily through its effect on the shadow economy? To attempt an answer, I 
aim to test the claim that if corruption is related to entrepreneurial outcomes in this way, then 
corruption should serve as a strong and valid instrument for shadow economy size in an 
entrepreneurial outcome regression. For this, I turn to GMM estimation. First, however, it is 
worth checking the robustness of the OLS results reported above. Columns 4, 5, and 6 provide 
GMM estimations using the following identification strategy: (a) I assume that Pop. Density, 
Median Age, College, and Male are exogenous variables; and (b) I include the 2000 values of 
these same variables as additional instruments. With the 2005 values as exogenous regressors, it 
is plausible that the 2000 values are correlated with shadow economy size, but otherwise not 
correlated with the entrepreneurship scores. Using the 2000 values of the control variables as 
additional instruments also provides over-identifying restrictions that can be tested to evaluate 
instrument validity. 
 Columns 4 and 6 report point estimates for the effect of shadow economy size on 
productive and net entrepreneurship, respectively. Again, both estimates are negative 
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(correlations are -15.634 and -23.969, respectively) and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. Column 5 reports a positive and statistically significant point estimate for the effect of 
shadow economy size on unproductive entrepreneurship (correlation is 9.418; significant at the 5 
percent level). It is worth noting here that GMM estimates suggest that the effect of shadow 
economy size on observed productive entrepreneurship is both statistically and economically 
more significant than the effect of shadow economy size on observed unproductive 
entrepreneurship. As with results reported in Figure 3.1, this adds additional support to my 
previous claim that the shadow economy is populated primarily with productive entrepreneurs. 
 Columns 4 through 6 also report the “1st stage” F-statistic (8.33) associated with a 
regression of Shadow on the instruments. The test rejects the null (instruments being jointly 
uncorrelated with Shadow) at conventional significance levels. Also reported are the p-values for 
the Sargen test of over-identifying restrictions J-statistics. Validity of the instrument set cannot 
be safely rejected in columns 4 and 6 (J-statistics are 0.514 and 0.240, respectively). The J-
statistic for column 5, however, rests on the margin of rejection (J-statistic is 0.100). 
 Based on these GMM results, the effect of shadow economy size on entrepreneurial 
outcomes illustrated in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2 OLS regressions (columns 1-3) are robust. 
Next, I move on to examine the primacy of the shadow economy as a channel through which 
corruption affects entrepreneurship.  
 
Does Corruption Affect Entrepreneurship Primarily through the Shadow Economy? 
Recall the basic correlations reported in Figure 3.2. The relationship between public official 
corruption and both productive and net entrepreneurship scores is negative (-17.218 and -20.149, 
respectively) and statistically significant (at the 1 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively). 
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The relationship between corruption and unproductive entrepreneurship is reported as positive 
(correlation is 2.931), but not significantly so.  
The question that I ask here is: does corruption affect entrepreneurship through its effect 
on shadow economy size? To get at this I am going to study the strength and validity of 
corruption as an instrument for shadow economy size. If a strong and valid instrument, 
Corruption will be correlated with Shadow (strong), but otherwise uncorrelated with 
entrepreneurship scores (valid). In other words, if the shadow economy is the primary channel 
through which corruption indirectly affects entrepreneurship, then I expect that co-movements of 
corruption and entrepreneurship are a result of co-movements between corruption and shadow 
economy size. Again, it is improbable that corruption affects observed entrepreneurship only 
through the shadow economy. Fortunately, however, both instrument weakness and validity are 
testable hypotheses.  
Table 3.3 reports results from GMM estimation of the productive, unproductive and net 
entrepreneurship scores when Corruption is added as an additional instrument variable. Adding 
Corruption as an instrument increases the absolute value of point estimates on Shadow for 
regression on both productive (from -15.634 to -16.286)  and unproductive (from 9.418 to 9.485) 
entrepreneurship scores, relative to the corresponding regression in Table 3.2 (columns 4 and 5). 
The absolute value of Shadow point estimates on net entrepreneurship fall slightly from -23.969 
to -23.219. Statistical significance of the Shadow point estimates remain unchanged at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, for regressions on productive, 
unproductive, and net entrepreneurship. 
Column 4 in Table 3.3 reports several tests evaluating Corruption as an instrument for 
Shadow. The t-statistic (2.54) is reported from a regression of Corruption on Shadow. The point 
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estimate on Corruption is statistically significant marginally at the 1 percent level (p-value is 
0.015). This alleviates concern about instrument strength. P-values from Sargen test J-statistics 
are reported at the bottom of columns 1-3 in Table 3.3. The over-identifying restrictions cannot 
be rejected at conventional levels of significance. I do not find strong evidence that Corruption is 
an invalid instrument.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the relationships between corruption (as a specific dimension of 
institutional quality), shadow economy size, and Baumolian entrepreneurial outcomes. The study 
is motivated by two basic questions: (1) what becomes of otherwise productive entrepreneurs 
who reside in (perhaps changing) institutional environments that largely (change to) reward 
unproductive activity? To date, research based on Baumol’s (1990) theory only discusses 
entrepreneurial outcomes in terms of formal economic activity. However, a plausible assumption 
is that productive entrepreneurs faced with institutional roadblocks migrate to underground 
economies. To this end, I ask: (2) what role does the shadow economy play in sheltering 
productive entrepreneurs from poor institutional environments, specifically those with higher 
levels of public official corruption? Moreover, how does the entrepreneur’s choice to exploit the 
shadow economy play a role in the relationship between public official corruption and observed 
entrepreneurial outcomes? 
Using OLS regression analysis, I find that shadow economy size correlates negatively 
(positively) and in a statistically significant way with productive (unproductive) 
entrepreneurship. This finding, at least, supports the possibility of productive entrepreneurial 
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migration to the shadow economy; and a support mechanism within the shadow economy for 
formal sector unproductive activity. Furthermore, these results are robust to GMM estimation.  
I approach question (2) above with both the OLS/GMM results and the following claim 
in mind: if corruption affects entrepreneurial outcomes through its effect on shadow economy 
size, then corruption should serve as a strong and valid instrument for shadow economy size in 
entrepreneurial outcome regressions. I present evidence that corruption is a strong instrument for 
shadow economy size; one for which validity cannot be rejected in regressions on productive, 
unproductive, and net entrepreneurship scores. However, I cannot safely assert that I find 
evidence of the shadow economy serving as a primary channel through which corruption affects 
observed entrepreneurial outcomes. Failure to reject validity of the corruption instrument is, at 
best, suggestive of the primacy of the entrepreneurial choice between formal and informal sector 
participation. 
 
 
  
 67 
 
FIGURE 3.1 – RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURSHIP SCORES AND SHADOW ECONOMY SIZE 
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FIGURE 3.2 – RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURSHIP SCORES AND PUBLIC OFFICIAL CORRUPTION 
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FIGURE 3.3 – RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHADOW ECONOMY SIZE AND PUBLIC OFFICIAL CORRUPTION 
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TABLE 3.1 – SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Data Source Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
       
Net Entrepreneurial 
Productivity Score 
 
 
Wiseman and Young (2012b) 48 0.38 15.01 -32.52 24.48 
Productive 
Entrepreneurship Score 
 
 
Wiseman and Young (2012b) 48 24.38 9.34 6.21 41.06 
Unproductive 
Entrepreneurship Score 
 
 
Wiseman and Young (2012b) 48 24.00 9.35 7.88 43.59 
Shadow Economy Size 
(% GDP) 
 
Wiseman (2012) 48 8.34 0.59 7.17 9.95 
Corruption (per 100,000) 
 
U.S. Department of Justice’s Report to Congress on 
the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity 
Section, 2010 
 
48 0.35 0.20 0.11 1.04 
Pop. Density 
 
Census Bureau 48 192.51 260.42 5.45 1169.82 
Median Age 
 
Census Bureau 48 36.59 2.07 28.01 40.63 
Bachelor’s +, % 
 
Census Bureau 48 26.27 4.73 16.50 37.00 
Male Pop., % Census Bureau 48 49.25 0.65 48.35 50.89 
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TABLE 3.2 – REGRESSIONS OF PRODUCTIVE, UNPRODUCTIVE, AND NET ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 1 2 3  4 5 6 
  
OLS 
  
GMM 
 Dependent Variables:  
Entrepreneurship Scores 
 
Dependent Variables:  
Entrepreneurship Scores 
Independent Variables 
 
 
Productive 
 
 
Unproductive 
 
Net 
 
 
 
Productive 
 
 
Unproductive 
 
Net 
 
Shadow -7.189*** 
(1.860) 
 
7.857*** 
(2.822) 
-15.046*** 
(3.675) 
 -15.634*** 
(3.512) 
 
9.418** 
(4.669) 
 
-23.969*** 
(6.636) 
Pop. Density 0.005 
(0.005) 
 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
 -0.003 
(0.003) 
 
0.011 
(0.010) 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
Median Age -1.550*** 
(0.471) 
 
-0.155 
(0.714) 
-1.395 
(0.930) 
 -1.301** 
(0.567) 
 
0.169 
(0.580) 
-1.630** 
(0.698) 
College 0.560** 
(0.239) 
 
0.059 
(0.363) 
0.501 
(0.473) 
 0.285 
(0.284) 
 
-0.047 
(0.368) 
0.111 
(0.544) 
Male -0.426 
(1.855) 
 
4.962* 
(2.815) 
-5.387 
(3.666) 
 -3.424* 
(2.073) 
 
6.579*** 
(2.360) 
-9.798*** 
(3.469) 
Statistics        
        
Obs. 48 48 48  48 48 48 
R2 0.642 
 
0.178 0.459     
  F-stat (1st Stage): 8.33*** 8.33*** 8.33*** 
  J-stat test p-value: 0.514 0.100 0.240 
        
        
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses below parameter estimates. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Shadow, Pop. Density, Median Age, College, and Male are 
assumed exogenous and 2000 values of those variables are used as additional instruments. F-stats are from 
regressions of Shadow on IVs.  
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TABLE 3.3 – REGRESSIONS OF PRODUCTIVE, UNPRODUCTIVE, AND NET ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 WITH CORRUPTION IV 
        
  
GMM: with Corruption IV 
  
 
 Dependent Variables:  
Entrepreneurship Scores 
  
Independent 
Variables 
 
 
Productive 
 
 
Unproductive 
 
Net 
 
    
Shadow -16.286*** 
(3.219) 
 
9.485** 
(4.431) 
-23.219*** 
(5.917) 
F-stat (1st Stage): 
 
T-stat: Shadow on Corruption: 
7.24*** 
 
2.54** 
 
 
Pop. Density -0.003 
(0.004) 
 
0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
    
Median Age -1.281** 
(0.597) 
 
0.161 
(0.580) 
-1.624** 
(0.691) 
    
College 0.243 
(0.272) 
 
-0.045 
(0.368) 
0.145 
(0.521) 
    
Male -3.705* 
(2.005) 
 
6.548*** 
(2.302) 
-9.403*** 
(3.143) 
    
Statistics        
        
Obs. 48 48 48     
J-stat test p-value: 0.660 0.110 0.377     
        
        
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses below parameter estimates. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Shadow, Pop. Density, Median Age, College, and Male are 
assumed exogenous and 2000 values of those variables are used as additional instruments. F-stats are from 
regressions of Shadow on IVs. 
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Chapter 4  
Religion: Productive or Unproductive? 
 
“Ideas, organized ideologies, and even religious zealotry play major roles in 
shaping societies and economies.” 
 
Douglass North – Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Chapter 5, Part IV 
 
4.1 Introduction 
What is the relationship between individuals’ religiosity and their entrepreneurial activity? While 
this and related questions have long been pondered, perhaps most famously in Max Weber’s 
(1905) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, it is the subject of only a few modern 
empirical studies.
34
 For example, based on individual-level data from India, Audrestch et al. 
(2007) find that Islam and Christianity tend to encourage entrepreneurship while Hinduism tends 
to discourage it. On the other hand, based on a panel of individuals from New Zealand, Carwell 
and Rolland (2007) find that non-Christian groups tend to be more entrepreneurial than 
Christians. 
                                                 
34
 For a review of history of thought on the economics of religion, as well as contemporary studies, see Iannaccone 
(1998). Regarding Weber, Tawney (1922) and Samuelsson (1961) are excellent examples of empirical refutations of 
his thesis regarding the Industrial Revolution and modern capitalist society. 
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 However, existing studies have not explicitly considered Baumol’s (1990) thesis 
concerning productive versus unproductive entrepreneurial activity. Regardless of whether they 
are conceived of as risk-bearers (Knight, 1921), exceedingly creative individuals (Schumpeter, 
1934), or those alert to hitherto unnoticed profit opportunities (Kirzner, 1973), entrepreneurs face 
decisions about whether to pursue wealth-generating activities or, alternatively, to engage in 
rent-seeking or outright theft. Their choices will largely be a function of the institutions – the 
“rules of the game” (North, 1990, p. 3) – within which they make those decisions. Religion 
represents one subset of those institutions.  
 There are numerous ways in which religious organizations and belief systems can shape 
the absolute and relative incentives to undertake productive and unproductive activities. For 
example, if a religion stigmatizes the accumulation of wealth and elevates the priority of the 
poor, then this may legitimize the redistributive use of political processes relative to innovative 
market activity. Alternatively, a religion may foster something along the lines of a “protestant 
ethic” (Weber, 1905) where individual industry is evidence of one’s salvation. More generally, if 
a religion makes the present value of activity in this world seem small relative to that of the 
eternal hereafter, then this may dampen an individual’s incentives to undertake any type of 
entrepreneurial activity. 
 For those individuals relatively prone to entrepreneurial activities, or who have relatively 
high endowments of entrepreneurial skills, religion can create costly obligations on time and 
other resources. Time spent in church is time that, by definition, is not spent on entrepreneurial 
activity; so is time spent in prayer. Income that flows into church coffers is income that does not 
flow into business ventures. Furthermore, given religious obligations on time and other 
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resources, whether individuals substitute away relatively more from productive or unproductive 
activities is again a function of the incentives embodied in the religion.   
In this paper we take Baumol seriously and explore the relationship between religion and 
entrepreneurship – both productive and unproductive – in data from the cross-section of 
contiguous U.S. states. There are only a handful of studies of religion and entrepreneurship based 
on U.S. data to begin with. Dodd and Gotsis (2007) examine survey data to explore whether 
individuals’ religious concerns temper their motive to maximize profits. Radmard (2012) uses 
county level data to analyze whether the percent of a population belonging to a religious 
congregation correlates with self-employment and small firm growth.
35
 None of these studies 
make a distinction between productive and unproductive entrepreneurship. We do so using 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship scores based on Sobel’s (2008) methodology and 
updated using data from the 2002 to 2008 period. 
 In measuring “religion” we attempt to break this institutional catch-all down into several 
of its formal and informal elements. We use data not only on religious affiliation and church 
attendance, but also on the importance that individuals place on religion in general, their stated 
belief in God, and the frequency with which they pray. Furthermore, we explicitly account for 
the percent of individuals who self-report as atheist and/or agnostic. These are individuals who, 
more than simply not attaching themselves to a particular religious sect, explicitly express a 
general lack of belief, or even disbelief. Agnosticism and/or atheism may be associated with 
more self-interested behavior; they may also make entrepreneurial activities less costly in lieu of 
religious obligations. 
                                                 
35
 Radmard exploits the large number of county observations to test for spatial autocorrelation and finds that 
congregation membership has spillover effects to entrepreneurship in neighboring counties. However, Radmard does 
not clearly describe the channels through which these effects might operate. 
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 We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 4.2 contains a review of some 
related literature on religion and economic outcomes. We describe our data in section 4.3. 
Results of our regression analysis are to be found in section 4.4 and the paper is wrapped up with 
concluding discussion in section 4.5. 
 
4.2 Related Studies 
As discussed above, the relationship between religion and entrepreneurship, specifically, has not 
been the focus of very many recent studies. However, several recent studies examine, more 
generally, the relationships between religion, institutions, and economic growth.  
Robert Barro and Rachel McCleary are at the forefront of this literature. Using cross-
country data, Barro and McCleary (2003) find that religious beliefs – in particular, a belief in the 
existence of heaven and hell – are associated with higher rates of per capita income growth. 
However, they also find that church attendance negatively affects growth. In the authors’ own 
words, “growth depends on the extent of believing relative to belonging” (p. 760). The data that 
we use in this paper allows us to evaluate Barro and McCleary’s conclusion in regards to 
entrepreneurial activity in the U.S., estimating the effects of belief and belonging separately. 
Complementing their earlier paper, McCleary and Barro (2006) investigate the effect of 
both economic development and institutions on religiosity. They conclude that the level of 
economic development is indeed a determinant of religiosity. Also, religiosity tends to fall with 
the extent of government regulation of religious activities. Their findings suggest that, in our 
analysis of religion’s influence on entrepreneurship, controlling for income levels will be 
desirable. Also, even though the formal regulation of religion across U.S. states is minimal due 
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to the first amendment of the federal constitution, we will control for a measure of institutional 
quality.     
There has been relatively little empirical analysis of the channels through which 
religiosity affects economic growth (e.g., Audretsch et al., 2007; Carswell and Rolland, 2007).
36
   
Here, we explore one potential channel though which religiosity may affect growth: 
entrepreneurship. Numerous studies document a positive relationship between entrepreneurial 
activity and economic growth (e.g., Zacharakis et al., 2000; Baumol, 2002; Baumol et al., 2007; 
Audretsch et al., 2006). Furthermore, Audrestch et al. (2007) considers the influence of religion 
on individual decisions to undertake entrepreneurial activity (measured by self-employment) in a 
cross-country study. They find that certain religions – e.g., Islam and Christianity – tend to 
encourage entrepreneurship, while others – e.g., Hinduism – discourage it. In a similar study, 
Carswell and Rolland (2007) find (for a New Zealand panel) that non-Christian groups tend to be 
more entrepreneurial than Christians.  
The main contribution of this paper is to extend the definition of entrepreneurship across 
a platform of both productive and unproductive activity and examine religion in this context. 
Baumol (1990) offered the hypothesis that different institutions, depending on the incentives 
they embody, largely determine whether entrepreneurs will focus their efforts on productive or 
unproductive activities. Where institutions create relatively large rewards to rent-seeking 
behavior, entrepreneurs will focus their efforts primarily on unproductive activities. On the other 
hand, where institutions primarily support wealth-generating activity, productive entrepreneurs 
will flourish. Sobel (2008), Hall and Sobel (2008), and Wiseman and Young (2012) provide 
                                                 
36
 Our literature review focuses on econometric studies. Alternatively, Kuran (2011) is an excellent example of a 
comprehensive history relating religious institutions – in particular, Islamic Law – to secular institutions and 
economic development from medieval times forward. 
 78 
 
evidence supporting Baumol’s hypothesis using U.S. data. To our knowledge we are the first to 
evaluate the Baumol hypothesis in regards to religious institutions in the U.S.  
 
4.3 Data on Belief, Belonging, and Entrepreneurship 
We begin by presenting some very basic looks at the U.S. state-level data on religion and 
entrepreneurship that we use in this study. Religion data are collected from three sources: (1) the 
Pew Forum’s 2007 US Religious Landscape Survey37; (2) the Gallup Poll’s 2004 and 2008 State 
of the States surveys
38; and (3) the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2000 and 2010 U.S. Religion Census: 
Religious Congregations & Membership Study.
39
 The Pew belief measures capture the 
importance of religion, frequency of prayer, and belief in God; the Pew Forum also provides data 
on the percent of a state’s population that attend religious services weekly. The Gallup affiliation 
data include the percent of states’ populations that are Protestant, Catholic, or Atheist/Agnostic. 
The U.S. Census Bureau reports a measure of each state’s Christian adherents40 as a percent of 
the total state population. 
Entrepreneurship scores for each of the 48 contiguous U.S. states are based on Sobel’s 
2008 methodology.
41
 Sobel uses data from 1995 to 2002 and we update his scores using data 
from 2002 to 2008. The scores are then based on averages of data that are generally centered on 
                                                 
37
 http://www.pewforum.org/Datasets:  Importance of religion is expressed as percent of state population who say 
religion is very important in their lives; frequency of prayer is expressed as percent of state population who say they 
pray at least once a week; belief in god is expressed as percent of state population who say they believe in God with 
absolute certainty; worship service attendance is expressed as percent of state population who say they attend 
religious service at least once a week. 
38
 http://www.gallup.com/poll/12091/tracking-religious-affiliation-state-state.aspx#2 
39
 http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/population.html 
40
 “Christian church adherents were defined as ‘all members, including full members, their children and the 
estimated number of other regular participants who are not considered as communicant, confirmed or full 
members’” (http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/population/religion.html). 
41
 For details see Sobel (2008, pp. 646-647; Appendix A). 
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the year 2000. They represent average levels of entrepreneurial activity in a state over a fourteen 
year period. 
Productive entrepreneurship scores are based on per capita venture capital investments, 
patents per capita, the self-proprietorship (self-employment) growth rate, establishment birth 
rates, and large (500 employees or more) establishment birth rates. Numerous studies focus on 
self-employment alone as a proxy for entrepreneurship.
42
 However, Hurst and Pugley (2010) use 
a variety of U.S. survey evidence to demonstrate that the self-employed do not fit common 
concepts of the entrepreneur. Specifically, they are not particularly innovative nor do their 
businesses tend to exhibit high rates of growth.
43
 Self-employment may often also be indicative 
of poor economic conditions where the opportunity cost (in the form of available wage 
employment) is not high (Rissman, 2003). By focusing on multiple indicators of profit-seeking 
and innovative activity we hope to capture a broad range of productive entrepreneurial activity. 
Also, since we look at averages over several years, we hopefully avoid short-run countercyclical 
self-employment fluctuations that are not indicative of entrepreneurism. 
Unproductive entrepreneurship scores incorporate three measures of per capita political 
and lobbying establishments in a state’s capital. These are based on the number of establishments 
in (i) SIC codes 8650 (political organizations), (ii) SIC codes 8650 and 8690 (membership 
organizations), and (iii) SIC codes 8650, 8690, and 8390 (social services organizations) (Sobel 
and Garret, 2002). The unproductive entrepreneurship scores are also based on (100 minus) an 
index of liability system quality. The latter is the Harris Poll published by the Institute for Legal 
Reform and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in its State Liability Systems Ranking. The Harris 
                                                 
42
 Recent examples using U.S. data include Hamilton (2000), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), Glaeser 
(2007). 
43
 Indeed, Hugh and Pugley present evidence that the self-employed do not tend to want to be innovative or grow 
their businesses considerably; rather, the non-pecuniary benefits of not working for someone else are their primary 
motivation for being self-employed.  
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Poll is an index of judicial quality on a 100 point scale. (Hence we take 100 minus this value.) 
States that have relatively low Harris Poll scores tend to have high rates of legal fraud and abuse 
in the areas of, e.g., workers compensation, class-action, and medical malpractice. All of these 
measures attempt to gauge the level of resources in a state that are being expended in legal and 
political processes rather than in productive market activities.  
Table 4.1 details the underlying data for the entrepreneurship scores. For both productive 
and unproductive scores, the constituent state-level variables are ranked from 1 through 48 from 
smallest to largest. A state’s score is then the average of rankings across the constituent 
variables.
44
 This index classification system (a Borda count) normalizes all of the constituent 
variables and weights all of the equally. Note that, for example, in regards to the per capita 
establishment variables (i), (ii), and (iii) in the unproductive entrepreneurship score, utilizing a 
Borda count does not double or triple count constituent SIC industry variables. Rather, it takes an 
agnostic stance on whether (i), (ii), or (iii) is a better measure, equally weighting each state’s 
rank for each measure in the ultimate unproductive entrepreneurship score. Finally, a state’s net 
entrepreneurship score is then its productive entrepreneurship score minus its unproductive 
entrepreneurship score. 
 For some initial perspective on the relationships between our dependent and independent 
variables of interest, we turn to Figures 4.1 through 4.4. All of these scatters are, of course, 
indicative of simple bivariate correlations and cannot be taken too seriously. However, we do 
here discuss some plausible reasons that they manifest. This provides some intuitive motivation 
before moving on to more formal econometric analysis where the question of these correlations’ 
robustness will be at the fore.  
                                                 
44
 For example, a state ranked 23, 45, 20, 25, and 38 in terms of, respectively, per capita venture capital investments, 
patents per capita, sole-proprietorship growth rates, establishment birth rates, and large establishment birth rates 
would have a productive entrepreneurship score of (23 + 45 + 20 + 25 + 38)/5 = 30.20. 
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Figure 4.1 presents scatter plots of worship service attendance rates against the 
productive, unproductive, and net entrepreneurship scores.
45
 Productive and net entrepreneurship 
scores are both negatively correlated with worship service attendance. (The correlations are -
0.385 and -0.667, respectively; both significant at better than the 5 percent level.) Unproductive 
entrepreneurship scores are correlated positively with attendance. (The correlation is 0.282 and is 
significant at the 10 percent level.)  Barro and McCleary’s (2003) cross-country analysis found 
that church attendance was associated with less economic growth and conjectured: “We think 
that this negative effect reflects the time and resources used by the religion sector as well as 
adverse effects from organized religion on economic regulation – for example, restrictions on 
markets for credit and insurance” (p. 3). The productive entrepreneurship correlation is 
consistent with an allocation of scarce resources toward religious activities and away from 
entrepreneurial ones. Regarding the significant positive correlation between attendance and 
unproductive entrepreneurship, religion may promote decreases in institutional quality generally, 
leading to greater opportunities for rent-seeking. It will be imperative in our more formal 
analysis, then, to control for general institutional quality. Another possibility, inconsistent with 
Barro and McCleary’s conjecture, is that religion may lead individuals to impose costs on others 
(via regulations on market activity) for the sake of their own (spiritual) gains.
46
 
It is interesting to note that attendance’s correlation with productive entrepreneurship is 
both statistically and economically more significant than its correlation with unproductive 
                                                 
45
 The results are limited to 39 states. Both Sobel’s (2008) scores and our more recent estimates cover only 48 states 
(exclude Alaska, District of Columbia, and Hawaii). Additionally, the Pew study combines, in several cases, two 
contiguous states to provide a single score for both. For this reason, the following states are also excluded: 
Connecticut, Maryland, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and 
Wyoming.   
46
 “Blue Laws” come to mind here – e.g., restrictions on Sunday retail activity. Alcohol prohibition – enacted by the 
18th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; repealed by the 21st – itself was the result of lobbying pressures from 
certain religious groups – specifically, Protestant missionary groups and the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union 
(Harris, 2004). 
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entrepreneurship. Also, the effect on net entrepreneurship is negative, suggesting that the 
negative effect on productive entrepreneurship dominates. Possibly relevant to this is the fact that 
a story of “the time and resources used by the religion sector” is apparently relevant to 
unproductive as well as productive entrepreneurial activities. (More time in church is less time 
available for either type of activity.) A positive effect of religion on unproductive 
entrepreneurship associated with institutional quality might be offset (at least in part) by the 
straightforward opportunity costs of being religious. 
 Worship attendance is a measure of religious belonging; what about religious beliefs? 
Figure 4.2 plots belief in God measures against the entrepreneurship scores. The results are 
similar to those using church attendance. Productive and net entrepreneurship scores both 
correlate negatively with belief in God. (The correlations are -0.484 and -0.745, respectively; 
both significant at better than the 1 percent level.) The correlation between unproductive 
entrepreneurship and belief is positive (0.261) but not statistically significant (p-value = 0.122). 
The estimated relationships are also similar when considering measure of the frequency of prayer 
(Figure 4.3) or the importance of religion (Figure 4.4) measures.
47
 Unlike McCleary and Barro 
(2006) who report different effects on economic outcomes associated with religious belief versus 
belonging measures, our first cursory look at the data suggests no such distinction when it comes 
to productive and unproductive entrepreneurship. 
 Before moving onto our regression analysis, we mention the additional controls that we 
will incorporate in that analysis. Importantly, we include a state’s (average of 2000 and 2005) 
Economic Freedom of North America (EFNA) score from the Fraser Institute (Karabegović et 
                                                 
47
 Additionally, similar results are derived from the raw correlations between the entrepreneurship scores and the 
various affiliation data from the Gallup Poll and U.S. Census Bureau, with one exception: Atheist/Agnostic 
affiliation correlates positively with productive and net entrepreneurship scores, and correlates negatively with 
unproductive entrepreneurship. 
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al., 2006). The EFNA scores rank U.S. states on a scale of 1 to 10, separately, for three areas of 
economic freedom: size of government, takings and discriminatory taxes, and labor market 
freedom. A higher score indicates more freedom (i.e., respectively, smaller government, fewer 
and lower taxes, and less restricted labor markets). The comprehensive EFNA score is the 
average score across constituent areas. Another important control variable is a state’s (log) GDP 
per capita. (We again use the average of 2000 and 2005 values.) This is a proxy for a state’s 
relative level of economic development. As suggested by McCleary and Barro (2006), the level 
of economic development may be an important determinant of religiosity. Omitting it from 
entrepreneurship regressions could then lead to biased coefficient estimates on religiosity. As 
additional controls we include, using data from the U.S. Census Bureau, a state’s population 
density and median citizen’s age; also the percent of its population with a bachelor’s degree 
worth or more of education, and the percent of its population that is male. Summary statistics and 
sources for all variables used can be found in Table 4.2. 
 
4.4 Results 
We run regressions of each entrepreneurial score (productive, unproductive, and net) on (1) a 
religion variable of interest and (2) a standard set of controls: (log) GDP per capita, EFNA, 
population density, median age, percent of the population with a bachelor’s degree or more, and 
the percent of the population that is male. The one-religion-variable-at-a-time approach is 
motivated by the fact that we are somewhat limited in terms of degrees of freedom (based on 
only n = 48) and, also, there is substantial collinearity among the religion variables. 
 Our religion variables are broken down into two groupings of four. All variables are in 
terms of percentages of a state’s population. First, there are religiosity measures: regular 
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attendance of religious services, belief in God with absolute certainty, prayer at least once a 
week, and importance of religion described as “very”. Second, there are affiliation variables: 
total (Christian) adherents, protestant, catholic, and atheist/agnostic. The last of these variables 
actually expresses the percent of the population that decidedly categorizes themselves as having 
no religious adherence. Presumably, such individuals do not pray or hold religion of any notable 
importance in their lives; they rank low in terms of both belief and belonging. 
 Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 contain results for productive, unproductive, and net 
entrepreneurship scores, respectively. Each table has eight columns of results; in a given table, 
each individual column is associated with a specific religion variable. In the productive 
entrepreneurship score regressions (Table 4.3) the coefficient estimates on the first seven 
religion variables are negative, and four of those estimates are statistically significant at the 5 
percent level or better (attendance, prayer, importance, and total adherents). In terms of belief 
versus belonging, both seem to be quantitatively meaningful. If a state’s attendance increases by 
a sample standard deviation (8.87), this increase is associated with about a 4 point decrease in the 
state’s productive entrepreneurship score. The effect is slightly larger for total adherents where a 
sample standard deviation increase (10.18) is associated with an almost a 5 point decrease in a 
state’s productive entrepreneurship score. While a one sample standard deviation increase in 
belonging-type prayer variable (2.39) is associated with just over a 2 point decrease in a state’s 
productive entrepreneurship score, the effect is larger for importance. A sample standard 
deviation increase (6.20) is associated with about a 4 point decrease in a state’s productive 
entrepreneurship score. 
 Interestingly, the percent of the population that is atheist/agnostic is positively and 
significantly related to a state’s productive entrepreneurship score. The estimated effect of 
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changes in the atheist/agnostic share of the population is (in absolute value) comparable to that 
of attendance and importance. A sample standard deviation increase in this atheist/agnostic 
(3.26) is associated with about a 4 point increase in a state’s productive entrepreneurship score. 
Because the score is a Borda count, another approximate interpretation of the size of such an 
effect is that a state would increase its rank among other states by 4 spots. 
 Table 4.4 reports the results based on using unproductive entrepreneurship scores as the 
dependent variable. While measures of both belief and belonging appear to be associated with 
decreases in productive entrepreneurship, this could be because religiosity imposes opportunity 
costs on time and other resources that could be employed in productive entrepreneurial 
endeavors; however, it could also be because of increases in the relative net benefits to rent-
seeking. In our data, the evidence for the latter story is somewhat weak. Total adherents is 
positively related to states’ unproductive entrepreneurship scores, and the effect is statistically 
significant at the one percent level. The effect is economically not negligible. A sample standard 
deviation increase in total adherents is associated with just under a 4 point increase in a state’s 
unproductive entrepreneurship score. However, none of the other religion variables, including 
atheist/agnostic, enter significantly into a regression of state unproductive entrepreneurship 
scores.  
 Given the effects reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, the negative estimated effect of total 
adherents on net entrepreneurship that is reported in Table 4.5 is not surprising. Recall that a 
state’s net entrepreneurship score is its productive entrepreneurship score minus its unproductive 
entrepreneurship score. The percent of a state’s population that report themselves as Christian is 
negatively and significantly associated with productive entrepreneurship in a state; positively and 
significantly associated with unproductive entrepreneurship. So it would stand to reason that it 
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enters significantly into a regression with the net score as the dependent variable. What may be 
surprising in Table 4.5, however, is the fact that the estimated effect of atheist/agnostic is 
positive and significant. This variable did not enter significantly in the unproductive 
entrepreneurship regression reported in Table 4.4, but its estimated (positive) association with 
productive entrepreneurship is enough to produce the statistically significant estimated effect on 
net entrepreneurship.  
 One could argue that, taken individually, significant results reported in Table 4.3 through 
Table 4.5 are driven by collinearity with the omitted religion variables in each regression. Table 
4.6 provides a correlation matrix for the belief and belonging variables. In Table 4.7 we provide 
regression results for each of our dependent variables that include all religion variables that 
exhibit statistical significance in any of the Table 4.3 through Table 4.5 results. Even only that 
subset of religion variables together is pushing the degrees of freedom available with the U.S. 
state-level data. Also, introducing such collinear variables is likely to inflate standard errors. 
However, it is the next logical step as a robustness check and we are interested to see whether or 
not any of the statistically significant religion variable effects hold up.  
In each specification reported in Table 4.7, the effect of total adherents is statistically 
significant and of the same sign as reported in previous tables. A sample standard deviation 
increase in total adherents is associated with an approximate 3 point decrease in a state’s 
productive entrepreneurship score (significant at the five percent level or better); a 5 point 
increase in a state’s unproductive entrepreneurship score (significant at the ten percent level or 
above); and an 8 point decrease in a state’s net entrepreneurship score (significant at the five 
percent level or better). However, none of the other religion variables, including atheist/agnostic, 
enter significantly into any of the regressions reported in Table 4.7.  
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Again, due to collinearity and relatively few degrees of freedom, we do not interpret this 
as a reason to dismiss the previous significant results, in particular those associated with 
productive entrepreneurship (Table 4.3). Rather, what we take from Table 4.7 is particular 
confidence that general religious belonging, as proxied for by total adherents, is negatively 
related to productive entrepreneurship; positively related to unproductive entrepreneurship. 
However, as a check on whether other significant results from Table 4.3 (for productive 
entrepreneurship) should be dismissed as artifacts of total adherents’ omission, Table 4.8 reports 
productive entrepreneurship regressions that include, separately, attendance, prayer, importance, 
and atheist/agnostic; while total adherents is included (along with the other baseline controls) in 
all regressions. As it turns out, with one exception all religious variables are rendered 
insignificant when total adherents is included. The exception is atheist/agnostic (column 4 of 
Table 4.8) whose estimated effect is positive and significant at the five percent level. However, 
the point estimate is less than half the size of that reported in Table 4.3. A sample standard 
deviation increase (3.26) in the percent of individuals reporting themselves as atheist or agnostic 
is associated with about a 1.6 point increase in a state’s productive entrepreneurship score.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have explored the relationships between measures of religiosity and the levels of 
entrepreneurial activity, both productive and unproductive, using cross-section U.S. state level 
data. To our knowledge, this is the only applied analysis of religion and entrepreneurship to 
incorporate Baumol’s (1990) conjectures on the role of institutions in determining whether 
entrepreneurs will channel their efforts towards wealth-generating activities or towards zero- or 
negative-sum rent-seeking. We also utilize various measures of both the belief (e.g., the 
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frequency of prayer) and belonging (e.g., protestant affiliation) dimensions of religiosity. This 
distinction in religious institutions, both formal and informal, has been stressed by authors such 
as Barro and McCleary (2003). 
 We find that measures of both religious belief and belonging tend to correlate negatively 
and significantly with a state’s productive entrepreneurship score. However, only a measure most 
straightforwardly interpreted as belonging (the percent of state’s population that reports 
themselves as Christian adherents) is robustly correlated with productive entrepreneurship. This 
could be because religion imposes opportunity costs in terms of time and resources that may 
otherwise have been devoted towards productive entrepreneurship. For example, time spent in 
church reduces time available for engaging in business activity. More subjectively, religion may 
create psychic costs to pursuing worldly gains rather than salvation in the beyond.  
However, the same measure of total Christian adherents is robustly and positively correlated with 
states’ unproductive entrepreneurship scores. This suggests something beyond a simple 
opportunity cost story. Alternatively, religion may correlate negatively with productive 
entrepreneurship because its institutions increase the relative net benefits of rent-seeking.  
Presumably religious obligations would consume time and resources that could be used for either 
wealth-generating or rent-seeking activities. Also, the percent of a state’s population that reports 
themselves as atheist and/or agnostic is positively and significantly related to productive 
entrepreneurship (even when controlling for total Christian adherents) but has no significant 
relationship with unproductive entrepreneurship.  
One possibility is that productive entrepreneurial activities are largely substitutes for 
religious ones while unproductive entrepreneurial activities are complementary. Independent of 
the depth of adherent’s beliefs, churches or other religious forums may function as special 
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interest groups. The most well-known example of this is the Christian Coalition of America. We 
do not wish to claim that this special interest group is especially prone to rent-seeking. However, 
there may be religious groups generally that, like the Christian Coalition, function as special 
interests and do indeed work through political processes to capture rents for their members. The 
time and resources used in these religious activities would not be available for wealth-generating 
ones, leading to substitution away from productive entrepreneurial activities.  
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FIGURE 4.1 – RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURSHIP SCORES AND WORSHIP SERVICE ATTENDANCE 
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FIGURE 4.2 – RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURSHIP SCORES AND BELIEF IN GOD 
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FIGURE 4.3 – RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURSHIP SCORES AND FREQUENCY OF PRAYER 
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FIGURE 4.4 – RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURSHIP SCORES AND IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION 
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TABLE 4.1 – DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES FOR VARIABLES USED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP SCORES 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
Measures used to construct Productive Entrepreneurship scores 
  
Venture Capital 
Investment Per Capita
1 
Average annual venture capital investment (all sources, including non-U.S.) per capita 
(2001-2008) 
 
Patents Per Capita
2 
Average annual number of utility patents granted (2001-2008) per 100,000 population 
 
Sole Proprietorship 
Growth Rate
1 
Cumulative percent of change in nonfarm proprietor employment as a percent of the labor 
force (NPE), calculated as [(NPE2008 – NPE2001)/NPE2000]*100 
 
Total Establishment 
Birth Rate
3 
100*Average annual number of new establishment births as a percent of existing firms 
(2001-2008) 
 
Large Firm 
Establishment Birth 
Rate
3 
100*Average annual number of new 500+ employee establishment births as a percent of 
existing large firms (2001-2008) 
 
 
Measures used to construct Unproductive Entrepreneurship scores 
  
Lobby Measure 1
4 
Number of Establishments in NAICS code 813940 (Political Organizations) in state 
capitals per 1,000,000 population (2001-2008) 
 
Lobby Measure 2
4 
Number of Establishments in NAICS code 813940, 813410, 813312, 561599, 813910, 
813990 (Political Organizations, and Membership Organizations) in state capitals per 
1,000,000 population (2001-2008) 
 
Lobby Measure 3
4 
Number of Establishments in NAICS code 813940, 813410, 813312, 561599, 813910, 
813990, 813212, 813219, 813311, 813312, 813319 (Political Organizations, Membership 
Organizations, and Social Service Organizations) in state capitals per 1,000,000 
population (2001-2008) 
 
Unproductive Legal 
Entrepreneurship
5 
100 minus the Harris Poll score. The Harris Poll score measures the quality of each state’s 
liability system on a 100 point scale. By our conversion, a score of 100 now represents a 
“poor quality” judicial system. (2001-2008) 
 
Notes: Productive, unproductive, and net entrepreneurial activity scores for our analysis were constructed by first 
calculating the measures according to Sobel (2008) methods for the period 2001-2008. We then averaged our scores 
with Sobel’s (2008) scores. SIC codes used in Sobel (2008) for the construction of lobby measures have since been 
updated to the NAICS system. The NAICS codes used here have been mapped to the SIC codes used by Sobel with 
an index provided at www.naics.com.  
 Sources 
1. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, State and Local Area Data 
2. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Utility Patent Counts by Country/State and Year 
3. Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics of U.S. 
Business. 
4. Sobel (2008) and County Business Patterns, U.S. Census Bureau. 
5. Institute for Legal Reform and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, State Liability System Ranking. 
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TABLE 4.2 – SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Data Source
 
Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
       
Net Entrepreneurial Productivity Score 
 
 
Sobel (2008) and  
authors’ own estimates 
48 0.38 15.01 -32.52 24.48 
Productive Entrepreneurship Score 
 
 
Sobel (2008) and  
authors’ own estimates 
48 24.38 9.34 6.21 41.06 
Unproductive Entrepreneurship Score 
 
 
Sobel (2008) and  
authors’ own estimates 
48 24.00 9.35 7.88 43.59 
Attendance, % 
 
Pew Forum 39 41.10 8.87 23.00 60.00 
Belief in God, % 
 
Pew Forum 39 73.21 8.09 59.00 91.00 
Prayer, % 
 
Pew Forum 39 16.74 2.39 11.00 21.00 
Importance, % 
 
Pew Forum 39 83.80 6.20 71.00 97.00 
Christian Adherents, % 
 
Census Bureau 48 48.85 10.18 30.65 76.70 
Protestant, % 
 
Gallup Poll 48 52.07 14.25 12.30 75.80 
Catholic, % 
 
Gallup Poll 48 23.42 11.55 6.40 51.50 
Atheist/Agnostic, % 
 
Gallup Poll 48 9.05 3.26 3.50 17.90 
Log GDP Per Capita 
 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce, BEA 
 
48 10.56 0.17 10.22 11.03 
EFNA 
 
Fraser Institute 48 6.94 0.53 5.44 8.32 
Pop. Density 
 
Census Bureau 48 189.43 258.15 5.27 1156.99 
Median Age 
 
Census Bureau 48 36.09 1.97 27.58 39.64 
Bachelor’s +, % 
 
Census Bureau 48 24.99 4.53 15.67 35.09 
Male Pop., % Census Bureau 48 49.18 0.66 48.20 50.92 
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TABLE 4.3 – REGRESSIONS OF PRODUCTIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP SCORES 
                              Specifications  
Independent variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Religiosity         
         
Attendance, % -0.437
**
 
(2.30) 
- - - - - - - 
Belief in God, % - -0.233 
(0.94) 
- - - - - - 
Prayer, % - - -0.940
** 
(2.03) 
- - - - - 
Importance, % - - - -0.639
** 
(2.36) 
 
- - - - 
Affiliation         
         
Total Adherents, % - - - - -0.467
*** 
(6.46) 
- - - 
Protestant, % - - - - - -0.127 
(1.46) 
- - 
Catholic, % - - - - - - -0.150
 
(1.59) 
- 
Atheist/Agnostic, % - - - - - - - 1.213
*** 
(5.0.) 
 
Controls         
         
Log GDP Per Capita -11.331 
(0.82) 
-7.957 
(0.51) 
-3.515 
(0.25) 
-10.921 
(2.36) 
-7.480 
(0.88) 
-12.541 
(1.16) 
-9.461 
(0.79) 
-9.692 
(1.06) 
EFNA 5.760
* 
(1.86) 
5.196
 
(1.44) 
4.158
 
(1.52) 
6.355
** 
(1.96) 
4.946
**
 
(2.35) 
7.337
** 
(2.51) 
6.486
** 
(2.11) 
6.190
** 
(2.48) 
Pop. Density 0.013
** 
(2.67) 
0.013
** 
(2.21) 
0.013
* 
(1.94) 
0.013
** 
(2.58) 
0.016
*** 
(3.88) 
0.010
* 
(1.94) 
0.017
*** 
(2.86) 
0.013
*** 
(3.25) 
Median Age -2.187
** 
(2.63) 
-1.409
* 
(1.94) 
-0.315 
(0.50) 
-1.725
** 
(2.43) 
-2.807
***
 
(5.53) 
-1.025
* 
(1.78) 
-1.002
* 
(1.76) 
-1.872
*** 
(3.54) 
Bachelor’s +, % 0.544* 
(1.75) 
0.642
* 
(1.80) 
1.041
*** 
(2.73) 
0.442 
(1.31) 
0.714
*** 
(3.60) 
0.785
*** 
(2.99) 
1.012
*** 
(4.09) 
0.615
*** 
(2.92) 
Male Pop., % 1.229 
(0.56) 
2.926 
(1.16) 
5.313
*** 
(3.46) 
0.590 
(0.24) 
0.543 
(0.40) 
-1.494 
(0.72) 
3.130 
(1.47) 
-0.583 
(0.31) 
   0.707 0.666 0.694 0.705 0.784 0.627 0.624 0.727 
Observations
 
39 39 39 39 48 48 48 48 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Constant included, but not reported. 
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TABLE 4.4 – REGRESSIONS OF UNPRODUCTIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP SCORES 
                             Specifications  
Independent variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Religiosity         
         
Attendance, % 0.023 
(0.09) 
- - - - - - - 
Belief in God, % - 0.343 
(0.87) 
- - - - - - 
Prayer, % - - 0.254 
(0.32) 
- - - - - 
Importance, % - - - -0.047 
(0.11) 
 
- - - - 
Affiliation         
         
Total Adherents, % - - - - 0.381
*** 
(2.80) 
- - - 
Protestant, % - - - - - -0.031 
(0.24) 
- - 
Catholic, % - - - - - - 0.200 
(1.14) 
- 
Atheist/Agnostic, % - - - - - - - -0.552
 
(1.20) 
 
Controls         
         
Log GDP Per Capita -33.091 
(1.62) 
-43.942
* 
(1.86) 
-32.947
* 
(1.87) 
-34.368
* 
(1.68) 
-27.822
* 
(1.92) 
-24.058 
(1.53) 
-27.624
* 
(1.73) 
-25.110
* 
(1.68) 
EFNA 0.565
 
(0.12) 
3.065
 
(0.53) 
0.523
 
(0.13) 
0.884
 
(0.17) 
-2.071 
(0.60) 
-3.535
 
(0.87) 
-3.126
 
(0.79) 
-3.335
 
(0.93) 
Pop. Density -0.001 
(0.07) 
-0.001 
(0.05) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.001
 
(0.05) 
0.007 
(0.70) 
0.008 
(0.71) 
0.005 
(0.48) 
0.009 
(0.81) 
Median Age -0.756 
(0.76) 
-1.422 
(1.38) 
-1.003
 
(1.11) 
-0.871 
(1.01) 
1.034 
(1.24) 
-0.225 
(0.29) 
-0.548 
(0.68) 
0.031 
(0.04) 
Bachelor’s +, % 0.434 
(0.71) 
0.264 
(0.45) 
0.333
 
(0.53) 
0.391 
(0.64) 
0.443 
(1.15) 
0.234 
(0.50) 
0.154
 
(0.35) 
0.410 
(0.99) 
Male Pop., % 0.133 
(0.04) 
-2.936 
(0.62) 
-0.175 
(0.06) 
-0.373 
(0.09) 
5.493
* 
(1.93) 
3.418 
(0.96) 
3.167 
(0.98) 
5.216 
(1.51) 
   0.282 0.299 0.285 0.282 0.335 0.222 0.244 0.244 
Observations
 
39 39 39 39 48 48 48 48 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Constant included, but not reported. 
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TABLE 4.5 – REGRESSIONS OF NET ENTREPRENEURIAL PRODUCTIVITY SCORES 
                          Specifications  
Independent variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Religiosity         
         
Attendance, % -0.460 
(1.37) 
- - - - - - - 
Belief in God, % - -0.110 
(0.458) 
- - - - - - 
Prayer, % - - -1.194 
(1.11) 
- - - - - 
Importance, % - - - -0.592 
(1.08) 
 
- - - - 
Affiliation         
         
Total Adherents, % - - - - -0.848
*** 
(5.69) 
- - - 
Protestant, % - - - - - -0.096 
(0.52) 
- - 
Catholic, % - - - - - - -0.350 
(1.55) 
- 
Atheist/Agnostic, % - - - - - - - 1.765
*** 
(3.07) 
 
Controls         
         
Log GDP Per Capita 21.760 
(0.74) 
35.985 
(1.13) 
29.432 
(1.11) 
23.446 
(0.80) 
20.342 
(1.02) 
11.517 
(0.48) 
18.163 
(0.74) 
15.419 
(0.72) 
EFNA 5.195 
(0.80) 
2.131
 
(0.28) 
3.635
 
(0.61) 
5.471
 
(0.81) 
7.017 
(1.44) 
10.872
* 
(1.70) 
9.612
 
(1.50) 
9.525
* 
(1.76) 
Pop. Density 0.013 
(1.25) 
0.014 
(1.25) 
0.012 
(1.13) 
0.013
 
(1.24) 
0.009 
(0.81) 
0.002 
(0.14) 
0.012 
(0.97) 
0.005 
(0.35) 
Median Age -1.431 
(0.92) 
0.013 
(0.01) 
0.688 
(0.51) 
-0.851 
(0.62) 
-3.840
***
 
(3.40) 
-0.800 
(0.64) 
-0.455 
(0.36) 
-1.903 
(1.55) 
Bachelor’s +, % 0.121 
(0.17) 
0.378 
(0.54) 
0.709
 
(1.00) 
0.051 
(0.07) 
0.271 
(0.62) 
0.551 
(0.93) 
0.858
 
(1.52) 
0.205 
(0.41) 
Male Pop., % 1.096 
(0.24) 
5.862 
(1.00) 
5.488 
(1.56) 
-0.963 
(0.18) 
-4.950 
(1.44) 
-1.924 
(0.39) 
-0.037 
(0.01) 
-5.798 
(1.23) 
   0.516 0.494 0.517 0.510 0.622 0.405 0.429 0.496 
Observations
 
39 39 39 39 48 48 48 48 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Constant included, but not reported. 
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TABLE 4.6—CORRELATION MATRIX OF RELIGION VARIABLES  
  
 Variables that exhibit statistical significance in Tables 4.3-4.5 
 Attendance, % Prayer, % Importance, % Total Adherents, % Atheist/Agnostic, % 
Independent 
Variables 
 
     
Attendance, % 
 
1.00 -0.47 0.90 0.61 -0.70 
Belief in God, % 
 
0.93 -0.49 0.93 0.48 -0.75 
Prayer, % 
 
-0.47 1.00 -0.48 -0.04 0.19 
Importance, % 
 
0.90 -0.48 1.00 0.52 -0.68 
Total Adherents, % 
 
0.61 -0.04 0.52 1.00 -0.63 
Protestant, % 
 
0.51 -0.14 0.57 -0.05 -0.50 
Catholic, % 
 
0.67 0.42 -0.62 -0.04 0.22 
Atheist/Agnostic, % 
 
0.70 0.19 -0.68 -0.63 1.00 
      
Notes: Correlations are reported in absolute value. 
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TABLE 4.7 – REGRESSIONS OF NET, PRODUCTIVE, AND UNPRODUCTIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP SCORES INCLUDING 
ALL PREVIOUSLY SIGNIFICANT RELIGION VARIABLES 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent variable 
Net Entrepreneurial  
Productivity 
Productive 
Entrepreneurship 
Unproductive 
Entrepreneurship 
Religiosity    
    
Attendance, % 0.018 
(0.04) 
-0.147 
(0.64) 
-0.165 
(0.46) 
Prayer, % 0.385 
(0.36) 
-0.265 
(0.54) 
-0.651 
(0.69) 
Importance, % -0.305 
(0.40) 
-0.209 
(0.56) 
0.100 
(0.16) 
Affiliation    
    
Total Adherents, % -0.858
** 
(2.52) 
-0.345
** 
(2.05) 
0.514
* 
(1.78) 
Atheist/Agnostic, % -0.565 
(0.70) 
0.005 
(0.01) 
0.570 
(0.76) 
Controls    
    
Log GDP Per Capita 22.387 
(0.75) 
-12.275 
(0.97) 
-34.662 
(1.55) 
EFNA 3.323 
(0.45) 
5.505
** 
(2.05) 
2.181
 
(0.35) 
Pop. Density 0.017
* 
(1.72) 
0.015
** 
(2.63) 
-0.002 
(0.36) 
Median Age -3.617
* 
(1.97) 
-2.743
** 
(2.64) 
0.874 
(0.64) 
Bachelor’s +, % 0.287 
(0.39) 
0.710
* 
(1.95) 
0.423
 
(0.64) 
Male Pop., % -2.514 
(0.48) 
-0.704 
(0.28) 
1.810 
(0.42) 
   0.629 0.786 0.370 
Observations
 
39 39 39 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Constant included, but not reported. 
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TABLE 4.8 – REGRESSIONS OF PRODUCTIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP SCORES, CONTROLLING FOR TOTAL 
ADHERENTS 
 Specifications 
Independent variable 1 2 3 4 
Religiosity     
     
Attendance, % -0.226 
(1.30) 
- - - 
Prayer, % - -0.133 
(0.27) 
- 
 
- 
Importance, % - - -0.362 
(1.53) 
- 
 
 
Affiliation     
     
Total Adherents, % -0.391
*** 
(3.51) 
-0.429
*** 
(2.91) 
-0.395
*** 
(3.53) 
-0.372
*** 
(4.39) 
Atheist/Agnostic, % - 
 
- - 0.499
** 
(2.06) 
 
Controls     
     
Log GDP Per Capita -10.644 
(0.89) 
-6.061 
(0.49) 
-10.975 
(0.90) 
-7.413 
(0.92) 
EFNA 4.831
* 
(1.88) 
3.797
 
(1.45) 
5.280
* 
(2.02) 
5.058
** 
(2.44) 
Pop. Density 0.015
*** 
(3.04) 
0.016
** 
(2.54) 
0.015
*** 
(3.00) 
0.015
*** 
(3.94) 
Median Age -3.083
*** 
(3.60) 
-2.513
** 
(2.47) 
-2.892
*** 
(3.87) 
-2.753
*** 
(5.54) 
Bachelor’s +, % 0.696** 
(2.36) 
0.847
** 
(2.33) 
0.629
** 
(2.05) 
0.629
*** 
(3.08) 
Male Pop., % -0.467 
(0.21) 
1.149 
(0.68) 
-1.045 
(0.44) 
-0.371 
(0.25) 
 
   0.781 0.771 0.784 0.796 
Observations
 
39 39 39 39 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Constant included, but not reported. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
 
This dissertation has addressed several topics concerning the economics of entrepreneurship, 
institutions, and underground economies at the U.S. state level. Empirical analysis begins in 
Chapter 2 where I evaluate multiple causes and multiple indicators of U.S. state-level 
underground economies using a MIMIC model estimation technique. Here, I provide the first-
ever estimates of shadow economy size for the 50 U.S. states (excluding the District of 
Columbia) for a period spanning a little more than a decade. I demonstrate that the size of 
shadow economies in U.S. states are likely dependent upon the size of government, tax and 
social welfare burdens imposed on the citizenry, labor market regulations, and intensity of 
regulation enforcement aimed at identifying and deterring underground participation.  
Across the states, government size has the largest, statistically significant effect on 
shadow economy size. A one-unit increase in the “size of government” score (which implies a 
higher degree of freedom from burden) leads to, on average, a 0.379 percentage point decrease in 
shadow economy size as a percent of state-level GDP. Taxes and charges – each as a percent of 
GDP – both exhibit positive and statistically significant correlations to shadow economy size 
(correlations are 0.206 and 0.068, respectively). A one-unit increase in the “labor market 
 103 
 
freedom” score (which implies a higher degree of labor market freedom) causes a 0.069 
percentage point decrease in shadow economy size, while insurance trust expenditures and 
protective inspection and regulation expenditures – each measured as a percent of GDP – both 
correlate negatively with shadow economy size (correlations are -0.200 and -0.054, respectively) 
in a statistically significant way.  
 Based on an index constructed with MIMIC model results, I find that, on average, 
Delaware, Oregon, and Colorado maintain the smallest U.S. shadow economies, while West 
Virginia and Mississippi secure the largest as a percent of GDP. Further, the sizes of all state 
shadow economies appear to have decreased over the period 1997 to 2008. 
 There tends to be a trade-off in which high-income states foster the smallest relative 
shadow economies, but the highest underground GDP on a per capita basis. Perhaps this is due to 
relative scarcity of underground services in high-income states. If so, one might expect that 
underground participants command higher prices in these places. Alternatively, high levels of 
human capital stock may play a role in the trade-off. High income states often demonstrate 
higher relative levels of productivity in the formal sector; perhaps the same is true of their 
underground economies. Of course, this is all mere speculation at this point. A task for future 
research in this area will be measuring the underground economies of the U.S. states using 
methods (such as surveys) to construct a more reliable dataset, including measures of shadow 
economy population.  
 Chapter 3 makes use of the shadow economy estimates constructed in the previous 
chapter to examine the relationship between public official corruption, shadow economy size, 
and observed productive and unproductive entrepreneurial outcomes using a cross-section of 
U.S. state-level data. This study takes a closer look at William Baumol’s (1990) entrepreneurial 
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theory – itself an extension of Schumpeter’s theory – and extends it to include an option for 
entrepreneurs to engage in shadow economies. How does the entrepreneur’s choice to exploit the 
shadow economy play a role in the relationship between public official corruption and observed 
entrepreneurial outcomes? In a series of OLS and GMM regression analyses, I demonstrate, 
robustly, that shadow economy size correlates negatively (positively) and in a statistically 
significant way with productive (unproductive) entrepreneurship. Moreover, these results suggest 
both the possibility of productive entrepreneurial migration to the shadow economy, and a likely 
support mechanism within the shadow economy for formal sector unproductive activity.  
I attempt to connect levels of public official corrupt to observed entrepreneurial outcomes 
by way of the shadow economy using instrumental variables. I argue that if corruption affects 
entrepreneurial outcomes primarily through its effect on shadow economy size, then corruption 
should serve as a strong and potentially valid instrument for shadow economy size.  
I present evidence that corruption is a strong instrument for shadow economy size. 
Moreover, I do not find strong evidence that the instrument is invalid in regressions on 
productive, unproductive, and net entrepreneurship scores. Failure to reject validity of the 
corruption instrument, however, does not provide evidence of the primacy of the shadow 
economy. It is only, at best, suggestive of the primacy of the entrepreneurial choice between 
formal and informal sector participation. 
This particular vein of research remains largely untouched, and leaves much room to 
explore several potentially important and interesting insights. Among them are the options listed 
in Chapter 3 related to, for example, the migration of Baumolian entrepreneurs across space; the 
conversion of productive activity to unproductive activity following institutional change; and a 
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closer look at unlawful, unproductive activity in both the formal and informal sectors as a 
response to institutional change; and so on.  
In Chapter 4, Andrew Young and I re-visit Baumol’s (1990) conjectures on the role of 
institutions in determining whether entrepreneurs will channel their efforts towards wealth-
generating activities or towards zero- or negative-sum rent-seeking. We do so in the context of 
informal institutions. Using measures of both the belief (e.g., the frequency of prayer) and 
belonging (e.g., protestant affiliation) dimensions of religiosity, we find that religiosity measures 
tend to correlate negatively and significantly with a state’s productive entrepreneurship score. 
However, only one measure – the percent of state’s population that reports themselves as 
Christian adherents – passes our tests for robustness in additional regressions on productive 
entrepreneurship scores. We speculate that this could be because religion imposes opportunity 
costs in terms of time and resources that may otherwise have been devoted towards productive 
entrepreneurship. Alternatively (and more subjectively), religion may create psychic costs to 
pursuing worldly gains rather than salvation in the beyond.  
The same measure of total Christian adherents, however, is robustly and positively 
correlated with states’ unproductive entrepreneurship scores. We argue that this suggests 
something beyond a simple opportunity cost story. It may be that religion correlates negatively 
with productive entrepreneurship because its institutions increase the relative net benefits of rent-
seeking.  
Interestingly, we also find that the percent of a state’s population that report themselves 
as atheist and/or agnostic is positively and significantly related to productive entrepreneurship 
(even when controlling for total Christian adherents) but has no significant relationship with 
unproductive entrepreneurship.  
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It is plausible that productive entrepreneurial activities and religious activities are largely 
substitutes while unproductive entrepreneurial activities are complimentary to religious 
activities. Independent of the depth of adherent’s beliefs, churches or other religious forums may 
function as special interest groups and work through political processes to capture rents for their 
members. The time and resources used in these religious activities would not be available for 
wealth-generating ones, leading to substitution away from productive entrepreneurial activities. 
This, of course, all amounts to mere conjectures, presently. Again, it hopefully represents fruitful 
avenues for further study. 
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